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THE
CHURCH OF ENGLAND CATECHISM
EXAMINED.

BY
JEREMY BENTHAM, Esq.

A NEW EDITION.

LONDON: 1834.
PRINTED FOR JOHN AND HENRY L. HUNT,
TAVISTOCK STREET, COVENT GARDEN.

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THE
CHURCH OF ENGLAND CATECHISM
EXAMINED.

Question 1. WHAT is your name?

Answer. (Pronouncing the child's name.)

Question 2. Who gave you that name?

Answer. My Godfathers and my Godmothers in my baptism (1); wherein I was made a member of Christ, the child of God, and an inheritor of the kingdom of heaven (2).

OBSERVATIONS.

(1). [*Godfathers and Godmothers in my baptism.*].—Thus far the answer appears not to stand exposed to any considerable objection; it being supposed that to this examination no child is subjected on whom the ceremony called *baptism* has not been performed. So far as this is true, the answer is nothing more than the statement of a matter of fact, of the existence of which, though, generally speaking, it is not possible the child should have any remembrance of it, it is but natural that he should feel himself assured by satis-

factory and unsuspected evidence. But this blamelessness—it will soon be seen whether it be of any long continuance.

(2.) [*Wherein I was made, &c.*].—Already the contempt of truth, pregnant with those incongruities of which that corrupt affection is so naturally productive, begins to manifest itself. In this formularly styled a *Catechism*, will be found involved, though many of them tacitly, in a manner and without any sufficient warning, a system of assertions, prodigious in extent and variety, contained in another formulary, being the verbal part of a ceremony of prior date, called *baptism*. Of this anterior ceremony, the *examinee*, a child, commonly but just able to speak—a child, in which the faculty of name has as yet scarcely begun to develop itself—a child completely incompetent to the forming of any *judgment*, or so much as a *conception*, in relation to the matter contained in it, is made to take upon himself to pronounce the effect.

Here, then, the first lesson which he is made to learn, and *that* under the notion of forming his mind to the sentiment of *piety*, is a lesson, which, if it amount to any thing and has any meaning, is a lesson of *insincerity*: and which, as far as it forms him to any thing forms him to insincerity. For hereby what is the declaration which he is made to utter?—a declaration, asserting in the character of a true fact, the fact of his entertaining a persuasion which in truth he does not entertain, and which that he should entertain, is, in the nature of the case, not possible. When by Rousseau, on the occasion of the stories commonly put into the hands of children under the

name of *fables*, the practice, of thus drawing from the fountain of falsehood and misrepresentation the first aliment presented to the human mind, was held up to view, and the absurdity and mischievous tendency of it displayed, deep and extensive was the sensation produced by the remark, not less so the conviction and recognition of the justice of it. But if, in any such profane book of instruction, the admission of falsehood be incongruous, and the habit of regarding it not only with indifference but with approbation pernicious, how much more so in a book of religious instruction? — in a book professing to introduce men to the favour of the God of Truth?

Yes, if by misrepresentation — yes, if by falsehood, any real and *preponderant* good effect could be produced, such as could not be produced by any other means. But by this or any other of the falsehoods so plentifully strewed all over this Catechism, and which will successively be held up to view, in what imaginable shape can any good be seen to flow?

Question 3.—What did your Godfathers and Godmothers then for you?

Answer.—They did promise and vow three things in my name (1): First, that I should renounce the devil and all his works (2), the pomps and vanity of this wicked world (3), and all the sinful lusts of the flesh (4): Secondly, that I should believe all the articles of the Christian faith (5): And, thirdly, that I should keep God's holy will and commandments, and walk in the same all the days of my life (6).

OBSERVATIONS.

1. *Things* is the name given to the *courses of conduct* which are the subjects of the vow here spoken of. But, before we enter upon the consi-

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and imposed)—*by our wisdom and our care, against abuse of this power, provision—effectual provision—has in and by this very instrument been made . . .*

Answer.—Yes; such provision as will be seen. But, in the mean time, and to authorize you to make this provision, what you have assumed,—and what for that purpose it was necessary for you to assume,—and *that* in the character of an universal proposition, is—that, by the Almighty, in consideration of that particular portion of wisdom which to *you in particular* it has happened to be blest with, such power not only is *fit to be given to rulers in general*, but *has actually been given to them*;—and this, be they who they may, to *all* rulers: and sure enough, if, to the extent to which, to the purpose of the argument, it is necessary it should be assumed, this general proposition is granted, every proposition necessary to the establishment of your own aptitude in particular may be thrown into the bargain, as not being worth disputing about.

But, any such power—when and on what occasion was it ever given? where is any the least evidence of any such gift to be found?

A job for the casuists.—Here is an engagement taken—an engagement taken in the solemn and awful form of a vow—a vow made by the sponsors—that the child shall do so and so: a vow made by A, not that he himself, but that B, shall do so and so. B, in process of time, breaks the vow: for this transgression—for this breach of a vow—of a *promissory oath*—for this species of *perjury*, who is it that is to be punished? A or B? or some one else, and who else? If pu-

tioned, viz. "*the keeping God's holy will and commandments.*" If all the days of his life so it is that a man has been keeping this holy will and these holy commandments, what he has thus been doing, is he to understand then that it will be accepted as sufficient? Not he, indeed:—remain for him to do all these other things, whatsoever they may be.

These things, whatever they are, if so it be that it is in *pursuance* as well as in consequence of the engagement thus taken, that they are to be done by him, then so it is that to his doing them one thing more is necessary; which is that he understand what they are: unfortunately here, it will be seen, lies the difficulty,—and that to an ordinary understanding, not to speak of extraordinary ones, it is much to be feared, an insuperable one.

Among the three things, or sets of things, that are to be renounced, first come "*the Devil and all his works.*"—The *Devil*, who or what is he, and how is it that he is *renounced*?—The *works* of the Devil, what are *they*, and how is it that they are renounced?—Applied to the Devil, who or whatever he is,—applied to the Devil's works, whatever they are,—what sort of an operation *renouncement* or *renunciation*?

To all these several words,—to one of them in particular, by which an idea no less terrific than obscure and indeterminate is wont to be excited, what tolerably distinct ideas can rationally be expected to be attached in the mind of infant simplicity and ignorance? When the holy person, whose name is next under the Sovereign's, seated on the pinnacle of theological science,—with

the *Archbishop of Canterbury* himself is able to tell us who or what the Devil is, what are his *works*, and by what operation they are *renounced*,—they being all the while things distinct,—all of them,—as well from “the sinful lusts of the flesh” as from “the pomps and vanity of this wicked world,”—then it is that it may be time enough to expect any tolerably clear and practically useful idea of all these mysteries to stand attached to these words in the infant mind, for the nourishment of which this composition, such as we see it, is the morsel first administered.

“*The Devil and all his works.*”—And in the first place, the Devil himself,—of whom so decided and familiar a mention, as of one whom every body knows, is made.—Where lives he? Who is he? What is he? The child itself, did it ever see him? by any one, to whom, for the purpose of the inquiry, the child has access, was he ever seen? The child, has it ever happened to it to have any dealings with him? Is it in any such danger as that of having, at any time, to his knowledge, any sort of dealings with him?—If not, then to what purpose is this *renouncement*? and, once more, what is it that is meant by it? Suppose him, however, to have actually renounced this Devil—that is, speaking of this Devil, to have said, *I renounce him*—in what condition is he, other than that which he would have been in had no such renouncement been made?—The engagement, whatever it be, if any, which by this renunciation has been taken, by what *act* or acts is it that it would be *violated*?—This is surely among the things that would be worth knowing, were it only that a man might

have it in his power to avoid the violating—the breaking—of this his engagement, without knowing and for want of knowing what it is.

“*The Devil and all his works!*”—Exists there any where any real being to which this name is applicable? If yes, exists there any sufficient reason for supposing that he ever made his appearance upon this earth?—ever made his presence sensible to, exhibited his person to the senses of, any human being that ever lived?

Not by unbelievers only, but by many a pious Christian, is the existence of any such being not merely doubted of, but, for such reasons as to them have been satisfactory, utterly denied:—the sort of *being* mentioned under this name being, in their notion of the matter, no other than an *allegorical* one; the passages, in which mention is made of him, so many purely *allegorical* or *figurative* expressions.

Figurative, and nothing more, was and is, according to them, the existence of this personage: figurative, and upon a line with that of *Jupiter* and *Juno* and the other inhabitants of the classical heaven, subjects or colleagues to those celestial potentates.

True, say certain fathers of the primitive Christian church. Yes; most exactly indeed upon a par were and are the Devils, great and small, with those *Gods* and *Goddesses*, great and small—with those *Dii majorum gentium*—with those *Dii minorum gentium*. Strange, indeed, if they were not upon a par, when in truth they were and are the very same. Who?—yes—who were *Jupiter* and *Juno* and the rest of them?—Who, but so many *Devils*, who, applying their

influence to the inhabitants of this earth, caused themselves to be respectively worshipped under those classic names.

In these later times, to men of the deepest learning,—though among them it probably would not be easy to find many, if any, to join their suffrages on this question with those of the above-mentioned fathers,—every thing relative to this personage, and in particular his existence, is matter of doubt and difficulty, and as between this and that one of them is matter of *dispute*. At the same time, even among babes and sucklings, there is not one who is not qualified to decide upon it, and so well qualified as in this our Church to be forced to decide upon it, and to decide upon it accordingly.

To any such tender mind how indeed should it be matter of doubt or difficulty!—when, besides being assured of the existence of this personage by the earliest of all lessons and highest of all authorities—(for that of *the Bible*,—a book of which the sense is to be taken upon the credit of this improved substitute, is but derivative)—not only his nature but his very form is brought to view and made known by those *portraits*, which are to be seen every where, and in particular in so many copies of the Book of Common Prayer, of which this Catechism forms a part.

To the learned, as well as to the gay, among persons of riper years, such portraits, with the infinite variety of tales connected with them, are either subjects of merriment or objects of indifference. But, to the multitude of the young and uninformed, whose learning begins and ends with this so highly magnified summary, serious indeed

is the idea attached to that tremendous sound. How many, from whose minds the horrific being,—of which, from the most unquestionable authority the existence is thus certified,—is never absent! How many, to whom this his ideal presence is sufficient to render *solitude*, at least when coupled with *darkness*, a situation of never-ceasing torment?

(3.) [*“The pomps and vanity of this wicked world.”*—Pomps and vanity, *two* other sorts of things given here as *one* thing,—and that one, as well as the things preceding and succeeding, a thing to be “*renounced*.” Renounced?—By whom?—By every member of the Church of England without exception, and *that* with almost his earliest articulate breath.

As to the *vanity*, with or without the subjoined limitation, by which it is confined to “*this wicked world*,” being in itself the *vainest* of all *vain* words—so completely *vain* as to be void of all meaning—it may, with that character attached to it, be dismissed.

But the word *pomp*—to this word is attached by usage—unvaried usage—a meaning somewhat more determinate and intelligible. Under the word *pomp* are comprised all those factitious appendages by which factitious dignity,—when combined with the visible and tangible fruits and marks of opulence,—is, in the hands of the *ruling few*, employed to distinguish them from the *subject many*.

The *Monarch*, in the first place, is it not by *pomp* that he is intended and enabled to display and preserve his *dignity*, and therewith and thereby

to maintain his *power*? The robes—the sceptre—the crown—the train of attendants, in so many forms and colours—armed and unarmed—if these be not the elements of *pomp*, what others are?

Not to speak of *Lords Temporal*, with their *titles*, their *coronets*, and their *armorial ensigns*, behold the *Lords Spiritual*, with the “*fine linen*” on their *shoulders*, the “*purple*” on their *liveries*, the *purple* and the *mitre* on their *equipages*. If not of *these things*, of *what things* is “*pomp*” made?

Of all these holy personages—these sitting and walking pageants—what one has there ever been, by whom all these *things* have not thus been solemnly *renounced*?—all these *things*, to which, disguised under the name of *decency*, they now cling with such fond and undisguised affection;—these *things*, of which the very essence of their order is, according to them, composed, and by the taking away of which *the Church* would, according to them, be laid in ruins, and along with it *the State*.

That this so much magnified instrument of theatrical piety is neither more nor less than a farce,—that nothing that is to be found in it need or ought to be considered as possessing any binding force,—that it is neither more nor less than so much sound without sense,—is not this the comment which, in that highest of all high places, the text receives from practice?

Such, then, being the judgment passed on it by the highest of all authorities, by what inferior authority—by what private individual—should any different judgment be passed upon it?

And this is the “*Instruction, which*” (as it says itself in and by its title) “*is to be learned of*

"of every person before he be brought to be confirmed by *the Bishop*:"—By the Bishop? and by what Bishop?—by the self-same Bishop, who by the "*pomps*," whatever they are, by which he is surrounded, manifests the contempt with which, by himself, this same *Instruction* is regarded: and who, at the very time when the youthful votaries whom he beholds at his feet are passing examination under his eye, under his authority, in and by the words thus forced into their mouths, made to declare the knowledge which they have of its contents, and the sentiments of veneration with which, by these same contents, they have been impregnated,—is all the while, in relation to these same contents, making manifest, if not his deliberate contempt of them, at least his ignorance or negligence.

(4). "*Sinful lusts of the flesh*." — In this may be seen the *third* and last of the three "*things*," or sets of things, which with its scarce articulate accents the child, so lately in its cradle, is made to declare itself to have "*renounced*."—Those "*lusts*," which he has so decidedly "*renounced*"—those "*sinful lusts*"—what are they?—what, in his view of them, can they be?—Is it that the "*lusts of the flesh*" are *all* of them "*sinful*," and as such to be comprised in the *renunciation*? or is it that, while there are *some* of them that *are* sinful, and such are to be "*renounced*," others there are that are *not* sinful, and accordingly are *not* comprised in it?—These are among the secrets, which, howsoever here *mentioned*, are not here *made known*. But are they not *worth knowing*?—Are they not *necessary* to be known?—Are

they not such as *must* have been known, ere the "*Instruction which is to be learned of* (meaning "*by*) *every person,*" can to *any one* person be of any sort of use?

(5). "*Secondly, that I should believe all the articles of the Christian faith.*"

Behold here another subject for a promise—for a promise in the shape of a *solemn vow*—in the shape of that sacred sort of instrument, which is neither more nor less than an *oath*, applied and adapted to this particular purpose. A promise?—to do what?—*to believe*:—a promise to believe an innumerable host of things,—and that without knowing what they are. For, be it observed, the thing to be believed is—not simply *the Articles*, but *all* the Articles. Follows, indeed, the *Creed* called *the "Apostles' Creed,"* the repetition of which is performed in answer to the presently following command—"Rehearse the Articles of thy Belief."—But in this Creed are they all contained? Not they indeed. For if they are, what is the *Nicene Creed*, and what the *Athanasian*?—both of them comprised in the *Liturgy*—that massy compound which the child is condemned to gulp down after he has swallowed this Catechism;—each of them as much a part of the Church of England Liturgy, and thereby of what passes among Church of Englandists for the repository of the Christian faith, as that called the *Apostles' Creed* is.

Question 4.—Dost thou not think that thou art bound to believe and to do as they have promised for thee?

Answer.—Yes, verily; and by God's help, so I will. And I heartily thank our heavenly Father, that he hath called

me to this state of salvation, through Jesus Christ our Saviour. And I pray unto God to give me his grace, that I may continue in the same to my life's end.

OBSERVATIONS.

Question. “*Dost thou not think,*” &c.—*Answer.* “*Yes, verily,*” &c.—Here then, not only do the authors of this formulary themselves advance this absurdity, but they compel the poor child,—as they have hitherto compelled so many millions—compelled, during so many successive generations, the far greater part of the population of the whole kingdom, and done what depended upon them towards compelling all future generations to the end of time,—to pronounce his assent to it and his approbation of it.

Now then, once more, if so it be that it is in the power of any three persons, under the name of *Sponsors*, to take possession of a child—a new-born child—and bind it, force it, to believe *this set of Articles*—how should it not be equally in their power to force it to believe any *other set of Articles*!—to believe, for example, the direct *reverse* of these same Articles?—If it be in their power thus to force a child,—to force as many children as they please,—to believe a set of Articles which *they* call “*the Christian faith,*” how should it not be in their power to force it to believe a set of Articles, for example, of *the Mahometan faith*?

Here then is a notion, which strikes—(for does it not strike?)—at the root of all religion as well as all morality: and, forasmuch as, in giving utterance to this mass of absurdity, the child is forced to say that *he believes it*,—while, at his years, at any rate, to believe it is not possible,—

thus it is that the duty and practice of *lying* forms part of every Church of England child's first lesson.—Forms part?—Yes—forms a part, though but a part, of what he is *taught*,—but forms nearly the whole of what—let us hope at least—it is possible to him to *learn* from it.

Command, immediately following upon the fourth question—"Rehearse the Articles of thy Belief."

Answer.—"I believe in God, the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth: And in Jesus Christ, his only Son our Lord, who was conceived by the Holy Ghost (1), born of the Virgin Mary (2), suffered under Pontius Pilate (3), was crucified, dead, and buried (4), He descended into hell (5); the third day he rose again from the dead, He ascended into heaven, and sitteth at the right hand of God the Father Almighty; From thence he shall come to judge the quick and the dead. I believe in the Holy Ghost (6); the Holy Catholic Church (7); the communion of Saints (8); the forgiveness of sins (9); the resurrection of the body, and the life everlasting. Amen."

OBSERVATIONS.

The Apostles' Creed! This name, thus formally and universally applied—applied to a formulary, which, of those by whom in that character it is forced into the mouths of children, there is not one by whom any such notion is entertained, as that any one of those immediate disciples of Jesus had any the smallest share in the formation of it!

Applied?—and by whom?—By the rulers of the English Church—of the Church of England, past and present—by that Bench of Bishops, whose name stands at the head of an Association, instituted for a set of purposes, of which the first in the order of time as well as of importance is the causing the whole population to receive the formulary in that character.

An association, of which one main object is, to

give currency to a *forgery*! to continue—and *that* for ever—to palm upon the rising generation as genuine an already exposed imposture. On the whole Bench sits there so much as a single individual, who will venture to declare that he believes it *not* to have been a forgery? that he believes any of those to have had a hand in it in whose name it is thus put upon the whole people?

To all those who do not, with a critical eye pointed to the questions of *verity* and *authenticity*, occupy themselves in the searching of the Scriptures, the immediate and sole looked-to evidence of that verity and authenticity consists in the implied evidence supposed to be bestowed upon it by those Right Reverend and well-paid witnesses. But here are these same witnesses, continually occupied in giving an attestation of authenticity to a document, of the seriousness of which they cannot but be, every one of them, fully conscious. If the religion of Jesus had no better ground to stand upon than this modern evidence, where would be the sort of regard due to it?

To give proofs, or so much as references to proofs, of its being a forgery—a generally exploded forgery—would be a mere waste of labour.—*Pearson*—*Bishop Pearson*—whose comment on it is regularly included in the list of works studied by all Candidates for Church of England Ministry, into whose heads any such idea as that of rendering themselves, in an intellectual point of view, in any degree fit for their office, ever happens to find entrance,—*Pearson*, in styling it *the Creed*, knew it too well to venture, either in his title page or any where else, to style it *the Apostles' Creed*; or so much as, in the way of insinuation, to give it to be understood that the

Apostles had, any of them, any thing to do with it. "*The Creed* received in all ages of the Church," (says he in his Epistle dedicatory): and thus far only did he venture to go beyond the truth in speaking of it, except by this, viz. "it is (says his Preface) generally taken to comprehend all things necessary to be believed:"—*the Creed*—as if he had never heard of more Creeds than this one: as if that Liturgy, of which it forms a part, did not, lest confusion should not be thick enough, force into men's mouths two other Creeds—the *Nicene* and the *Athanasian* (yes, the Athanasian!) by the side of it.

For the first time—(pity the edition now on the table, though the *tenth*, does not enable any one to say exactly what time was)—for the first time—observing what sort of a thing this tissue of dark allusions, taken in its own state, was,—he formed the generous resolution of rendering it intelligible: and in this endeavour, no fewer than four hundred closely printed folio pages, with more of microscopic notes than text, are employed: "so that every one, when he pronounceth the Creed, may know, (says the good Bishop) what he ought to intend and what he is understood to profess, when he so pronounceth it:" so that now, to all those in whose instance to the labour of studying this *Exposition*, and the faculty of buying or borrowing it, has been added the felicity of understanding it, the text, in so far as the enterprise undertaken by the comment has been successful, has been rendered intelligible.

Creed and Exposition together, of those who but for it would have been damned, how many will have been saved by it? Of those who, if

they had had it, would have been saved, how many will have been damned for want of it?—those included who will not have been rich enough either to buy or borrow it. When to each of these questions a satisfactory answer has been provided, then it is that of its worth a correct estimate as well as conception will have been formed.

This, together with both the other Creeds, and together with the spirit and so large a portion besides of the substance of her Liturgy, was by the Church of England received from her Holy Mother: among whose histories that of the *pic-nic* formation of this Creed by its putative fathers the Apostles may be found in their proper places. The equally established Church of *Scotland* is wiser and honester than to teach any of these Creeds.

Of the three declarations of persuasion, which, under the name of *Creeds*, are all adopted into and make part of the Church of England Liturgy, this,—which by universal confession falsely (1), yet not the less universally, is called *the Apostles' Creed*,—is one.

In relation to this instrument, as here placed and employed, two questions naturally present themselves—

1. The set of opinions here stated as deduced from the text of holy writ, are they rightly deduced from holy writ? Do they in holy writ find a sufficient warrant?

If yes, is it right and useful to take the whole of the instrument as it stands,—and thus, at the tenderest age, force it into the mouths of children?

Of these questions, the first does not in any pe-

these things, even a trap, and the
which are in the world, - as a way
for the remission of sins, all
ever he must by various means
for the sake of getting a good
a Christian) and before that, pay
vices.

Men's idea, who would have been
 clear view of the position, the
 the last of the century, the
 very actually passed the
 engagement, filled as it is by the
 ing? — But why not
 kept, on any day, as it were,
 the nature of the case, as it is
 should will be seen as it is
 of the picture, it is not a matter
 at the same time, it is not a matter
 can be seen it is not a matter
 circumstances? — But it is a matter
 among these things, which is the
 reference, are not less a matter
 enough, if every thing is not
 of such consequence, as to
 have made it impossible.

[illegible]

much difficulty.—But death? the death of whom? —the death of a God?—What! a God? a God of *our own* die?—Much about this time, perhaps a little earlier, perhaps a little later, it may have happened to the child to hear of the Gods of the *heathens*—Gods in multitudes—not one of them subject to death. In such a case, how inferior will this comparatively new God be apt to appear to him, in comparison of the least of these ancient ones! But if God the *Son* was thus mortal, what should preserve his Father from being mortal too? If it was the Son's turn to die at that time, may it not one of these days be the Father's turn? and then what is to become of the world and all that live in it?

For the removal of this difficulty; what answer is left, but the doctrine of the *two natures*? Jesus (the child must be told) had two natures—the human and the divine: he was a man and a God; that is *the* God—for there is but one God—at the same time. It was the man only that was crucified, and, dying under the operation, was then buried. The God did not die: in the case of God, no such thing as death took place: it is not in the nature of God, that is to say, of the one God, to die. Well, then, while one of these persons, viz. the man, was dying, the other of them, the God, the one God, whereabouts was he?—Have a care, child, what you say. Two persons? no such thing. Man one, God one: these one and one, which you in your ignorance take for two, are not two persons: they are but one.—How but one person? One man, is not that one person? and one God, is not that another person? One and one, do they not make two?—In answer to any such questions,

nothing remains but to chide the poor child for his ignorance—to insist upon his understanding in this case the difference between a nature and a person, and thereupon to plague him till he declares himself satisfied, that though Jesus had two *natures*, he had but one *person*, and that, in that instance at least, so far as *personality* was concerned, a *God*—no, not a *God*, but *God*—yes, *God*, and man together, were one and the same.

Now, to any practical purpose, whether this or any part of it be true or no, is not, to child or man, worth inquiry. How should it be? For to human conduct, take it in any of these ways, what difference does it make? But, in regard to all this, or any part of this, to force a child to declare—to declare most solemnly and seriously, that he believes it,—believes it just as he believes in the existence of the person by whose words and gestures the words are forced into his mouth, and this in a case in which any such belief is as plainly impossible!—in this lies the mischief:—and, so long as in a habit of falsehood and insincerity, and that a universal one, there is any thing mischievous, this mischief will be as real as the pretended belief is false.

(5). [*He descended into hell.*].—Of the matter of fact here asserted, the truth being admitted—(though for the admitting it no warrant was ever so much as attempted to be found in any part of Scripture that bears any relation to Jesus, and though as well might it have been asserted, that, while a visit was then paid to *hell* by *Jesus*, a visit was at the same time paid to *heaven* by the *Devil*)—still, on this as on so many preceding and

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succeeding occasions, comes the question—supposing the fact ever so well established, to what possible good use force a child, as soon as it can speak, to say that it believes this, or so much as use any endeavours to cause it actually to believe any such thing?

When, against this proposition, the monstrous absurdity of it, coupled with its utter destituteness of all warrant from Scripture, is brought to view, the observation made by way of answer—and that probably enough a true one, is—that in this particular the *translation* is incorrect; for that in the original Greek the word rendered in English by *hell*, did not on this occasion mean that which on every other occasion it is commonly understood to mean—viz. the abode and place of torment of the damned.

But, besides that of this observation a necessary effect is to give birth to another question,—viz. if not *hell*, what other place then is on this occasion to be understood?—(a question, to which an answer would not, it is supposed, be very easy to be found)—another observation is, that in the case of at least nine hundred and ninety-nine out of a thousand of those whose salvation is understood to be in so material a degree dependent—dependent, in some way or other—upon this Catechism, no such mistranslation is known or so much as suspected. In the conception of this vast majority, the place of torment appointed for the Devil and his angels,—*this* is the place to which the visit of this Son of God—himself God—was, in his own divine person, paid.

Of this perplexity, added to so many of her perplexities, what is the result? That, in the

minds of a very large proportion of the whole number,—a very large proportion, if not the whole, of this discourse, called a *Creed* and *the Creed*, produces the same effect as, and no more than, so much inarticulate sound. Not but that if, in the instance of the whole number, such were the case with *the whole* of this same creed, it would be all the better; always excepted the mischief of the lie which the child is taught and compelled to utter, in thus seriously and solemnly declaring that he believes it.

(6). [*I believe in the Holy Ghost.*].—Mere sounds without sense: mere words without meaning: not only void of all meaning, which to any *such young* person can be of any *use*—not only void of all meaning which to *any* person can be of any use,—but without any thing attached to them that can be called *meaning*.

What is the *Holy Ghost*?—*Answer*. The same as the *Holy Spirit*.

What then is the *Holy Spirit*? — *Answer*. The Spirit of God.

What then is this Spirit of God, that, when you believe this God, this should not be enough, but that you must believe in this Spirit of God besides? Believing in a man, what more do you do by believing in his Spirit likewise?

“*The Lord be with you,*” says the Minister to the congregation in one part of our Liturgy. Not to be behind hand with him either in piety or politeness, nor yet to give him back his compliment without variation, as if for want of words, “*And with thy Spirit,*” returns the *Chorus*, under the command of the clerk. In any such

variation of the phrase, has imagination in its extravagance ever soared to such a height as to fancy itself to be possessing and employing a *re-agent*, having the effect of *decomposing* a human person, in such sort as to convert him, poly-pus like, into *two* persons, of which *himself* is one and his *spirit* the other?

If believing in God be not enough, without believing in the Spirit of God besides, how came *this* to be enough? To believe in the Spirit of God in addition to God himself, how can this be sufficient, when, besides the Spirit of God, according to the flowery texture of the same language and the same Scriptures, there are so many other things belonging to God, viz. the hand of God, the arm of God, the finger of God, the word of God, the power of God, the glory of God, and so forth: each of them not less susceptible, than the Spirit of God, of a separate existence.—Oh, silly men—yes, if sincere, “more silly than “any sheep, which on the flowery plains shepherd “did ever keep”—ye string words upon words,—and then, for every word believe, or pretend to believe, that a correspondent really existing object is brought into existence.

The Holy Ghost being, at the end of the account, something which is the same as God and at the same time distinct from God,—and being something in which, day by day, the child is obliged to say that he believes,—by the sense of this obligation, should it happen to him to be induced to put himself upon the look-out for something determinate to believe in,—of such his inquiry, what, if any thing, will be the result?

In the same instructive prints which present to

his view the *Devil* in the character of a black man, with horns on his head and a tail to his rump, he will behold a *pigeon*, hovering in a spot of light. This *pigeon*, which, however, he will be taught to call not by this name, but by its other and more poetical name, a *dove*—this *pigeon* it is, that if any thing will be the object of his belief.

Our God, whose picture *here* and *now* must not be drawn, but which when *here* it *was* drawn, *was*—and *there* where it is drawn, is—the picture of an *old man*;—another *God*, whose picture may be drawn, and is continually drawn, and when drawn is seen to be the picture of a *young man*—which God is likewise not only a God but also a man;—a *third* God, whose picture may be drawn, and being drawn, is seen to be the picture of the sort of *pigeon* called a *dove*,—these three Gods, who, man and *pigeon* included, make, after all, but one and the same object of belief, and that object a *God*,—these, when this system of instruction has been read, marked, learnt, and inwardly digested, comprise and constitute the *subject* of all this science—the *object* of the young child's belief—of that belief, of which he is forced to say that he entertains it.—That he entertains it?—why?—Even because, in an unthinking and half-hearing moment, three persons, under the rod of the law,—to save him from the endless and inscrutable mass of temporal inconvenience, attached to the non-performance of the ceremony,—undertook, by that which would be not only a *rash*, but a *flagitious*, were it any thing but a *senseless* vow, that, after having begun to entertain this belief, before he knew or cared what it was that he

was thus entertaining, he would to the end of his life continue to entertain it.

(7.) [*The Holy Catholic Church.*].—*The Holy Catholic Church.* — “*I believe in the Holy Catholic Church.*” — Not to speak of former times, what is it that *at present* a child can understand himself to have spoken of himself as doing, when he has declared that he believes in *the Holy Catholic Church*?—*I believe in God*?—Yes, this is what he *may* conceive himself to understand.—*I believe in God*; i. e. I believe in the existence of a God—and so in regard to *Jesus Christ* and the *Holy Ghost*. But—*I believe in the existence of a Holy Catholic Church*?—For this same Church, of which, under the name of *the Holy Catholic Church*—one Holy Catholic Church, and no more than one—he is thus forced to speak, where is it that he is to look? If, by any such name as *the Catholic Church*, there be any thing that on any other occasion he has ever heard spoken of as being in existence, it will have been *the Roman Catholic Church*—a Church composed of *Roman Catholics*, who are the same men that are sometimes called *Papists*, and who, when they were in power, burnt as many of the good people called *Protestants*, of whom he himself is one, as for that purpose they could lay hold of. Now, as to the *Holy Ghost*, in whom the child has just been declaring himself to believe,—whatsoever is or is not meant by *holiness*,—that *Ghost*, without any difficulty, is *holy*. But this Church, composed as it is of the barbarous men called *Papists*, is this too, *Holy*?—holy, even as the *Holy Ghost* is *Holy*?—On the part of the poor child, suppose any particle of thought to be bestowed upon the

subject, how distressing must be the perplexity into which he here finds himself plunged? — But no:—before it has arrived thus far, the plain truth of the case is—that, whether in the breast of a child or in the breast of an adult, the faculty of thought, having found itself baffled and wearied out, has, in despair, withdrawn itself from the whole subject, leaving in the grasp of the conception and the memory nothing but a string of sounds and characters, void of all sense.

(8). [*The Communion of Saints.*].—*The Communion of Saints?* One more puzzle; a riddle which unhappily is not explicable, but which happily is not worth being explained.

The Communion of Saints—What is a *Communion*? What are *Saints*?—Saints, the poor child will soon have heard of.—There is St. Peter; there are the rest of the twelve Apostles, (Traitor Judas being excepted): there are Jesus's four *Biographers*, decorated with the title of *Evangelists*; all or most of them more or less known to him by their portraits; all of them striking likenesses; and, though last not least, there is St. Paul, whose beginning had borne but too near a resemblance to the latter end of Judas. In the *Communion*,—or, at any rate, in a communion,—the child may likewise ere long behold a thing which he has *heard of*, and moreover *heard*—a part of the Church service, called sometimes for shortness the *Communion* simply, at other times without abbreviation the *Communion Service*.—*Communion—Saints—belief*—putting together the ideas brought to view by these three

words,—what in relation to this matter will be the little creature's belief? — something, perhaps, to this effect; viz. that, among the Apostles and whatever other holy men used to be called *Saints*, it was a custom to join together in the performance of *the Communion service*; of the Communion service,—worded, as he has seen it, or is about to see it worded, viz. in the *Church of England Liturgy*.

If this be an error, well would it be for the successive generations by which the compound here analyzed is destined to be swallowed,—not to speak of those by whom it *has been* swallowed,—if, of all errors contained in it, this were the most pernicious one.

Saints, whose portraits he has there been used to see—that, like good Saints as they were, they used, all of them, to join in the performance of the Communion service—this may do for a time. But to believe in the Communion of Saints, is to believe in the Saints themselves:—and who are these Saints? Any such question, should it ever happen to him to put to himself, what answer will he have to give?—Where shall he find it?—Where shall he look for it?—Sooner or later it may happen to him to look into the Calendar that stands at the commencement of his Common Prayer Book, more especially as it is there that he will have to look for Holidays. Looking into this treasury of consecrated idleness, he will find, that, to the original stock of Saints, he will have to add a list of modern ones; not to speak of Martyrs and Confessors, with whom this Catechism has happily abstained from burthening his memory and his conscience. Neither in this however will there

be any great difficulty : and now, to his belief in the Devil will be added his belief in *Saint Dunstan*, whose Church is established still in Fleet-street, and whose Saintship consisted in pulling the unclean spirit by the nose. Here at any rate may be Saints enough to satisfy his believing appetite, so long as his studies are confined to the Common Prayer Book, of which this Catechism makes a part, and the Calendar by which it is commenced or preceded. But by the Holy Scriptures—should they ever carry him so far—how will those ideas, which by the Common Prayer Book he had been led to form of Saints, be enlarged, and at the same time confused and troubled ? On this head, are the Holy Scriptures—is the New Testament—are the Acts of the Apostles, to be believed ? If so, then is every one a Saint by whom the religion of Jesus is, or ever has been, or shall ever have been, professed. Read to this purpose the Acts of the Apostles ; or, what is shorter, turn to any *Concordance*.

If this be so, then in the number of these holy subjects or objects of his belief, he may have to place not only *St. Peter* and *St. Paul* with their contemporaries, as above, with such of their successors as *St. Sutton*, and *St. Vernon*, and *St. Howell*, and *St. Burgess*, and *St. Eldon*, and *St. Sidmouth*, and *St. Harrowby*, and *St. Bailey*, and *St. Stevens*, and *St. Parke*, and *St. Wilberforce*, and *St. Bernard*, and *St. W. Milner* the Protestant, and *St. Milner* the Catholic, and *St. Hannah* and *St. Joanna*,—but *St. Napoleon*, moreover, and *St. George*, and *St. Ellenborough*, and *St. Yarmouth the Orangeman*, and *St. Headfort*,

repeated Creed?—from this discourse is the belief of any such thing as *redemption* to be learnt? Look at it, reader, once more : examine it from top to bottom. Of no such thing—any the slightest intimation will you find in it.

But *mankind*, all of whom the child is thus made to say he believes to have been redeemed—redeemed, along with himself, by Jesus—*they*, on considering the condition in which they will be seen to be placed, present some claim to notice.

Of this *redemption*, the *universality* any more than the *fact* is not here meant to be disputed. But, whosoever has been made to declare himself to be a believer in it, it might not have been amiss, it should seem, had some little provision been made for preserving him from any such obligation as that of declaring, on an eventually subsequent occasion, a directly opposite belief: viz. that of declaring, in solemn form, his belief of and in the entire contents of that other formulary called the *Thirty-nine Articles*.—Of that test and treasury of Church of England orthodoxy, in *one* article, viz. the 18th, intituled, “*Of obtaining eternal salvation only by the name of Christ*,” “Those (it is said) are to be held accursed, that “presume to say that every man shall be saved by “the law or sect which he professed, so that he be “diligent to frame his life according to that Law “and the Light of Nature. For Holy Scripture “doth set out unto us (concludes the article) only “the name of Jesus whereby men must be saved.”

Not to speak of any *former* portion of time,—of the whole number of human beings existing at *this* time upon this our earth, by far the greater number, it is manifest, can never have heard

of any such person or name as *Jesus*. This great majority—are they capable of being saved, each of them “*diligently framing his life,*” in the terms of the article, “according to the Law of Nature,” (i. e. it must be presumed, leading a virtuous life), or are they not?

Being, along with the rest of mankind, redeemed by *Jesus*, is a man *capable* of being “*saved,*” otherwise than “by the name of *Jesus*?”—then is the article *false*.—Is he *incapable*?—then where is the use of such *redemption*, and what is a man the better for it?

Every man who takes what are called *Holy Orders*—every man, whose name is entered in the books of either University—declares in writing his belief in *all* these *Articles*. But, as hath been seen, no sooner does he thus declare, than, by such his declaration, he contradicts the belief thus expressed in and by this his *Catechism*.

By parental authority—by the compulsion, inseparable from the exercise, however directed, of that authority,—in a word, by *force*—by any thing but *argument* or *reason* applied to the understanding,—during a long and uninterrupted course of years, he is made continually to declare this to be his belief: thereupon, when the time for the purchase of a ticket in the Ecclesiastical Lottery, and with it the time for *Subscription* comes,—all on a sudden he turns short round, casts from him this his belief, and embraces the reverse of it.

All this with the most perfect, and the most exemplary *regularity*: and thus it is that *order*, *good order*, *regularity*, *decency*—sounds so sweet to the ears of *Orthodoxy*, *Despotism*, and their ever ready handmaid, *Mendacity*—are preserved.

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(3) [*Thirdly, in God the Holy Ghost, who sanctifieth me and all the elect people of God.*].—In explanation of the function called *sanctification*, thus allotted to God the *Holy Ghost*, what, in this instrument, is there to be found?—Just as much as in explanation of the function of *redemption*, just allotted, as above, to God the *Son*.

Whence then all this elaborate distinction of functions? all the work thus given to the carving knife? The Godhead being, as every body is supposed to know, or at least made to say, composed of three persons,—and, on the occasion in question, the plan being to give something to do for each,—thereupon, the less plainly incomprehensible functions of *creation* and *redemption* being already disposed of,—divided, as hath been seen, between the two other persons of this undivided Trinity, comes the question—what can we find for the Holy Ghost to do?—Answer. *Sanctification*.—Here, then, whatsoever be the meaning of it, here was a sort of *employment* found for him, every other being engaged.

Here, then, in this word, we have the name of a sort of *process*, which the child is made to say is going on within him; going on within him at all times—going on within him at the very instant he is giving this account of it. This process, then, what is it? Of what feelings is it productive? By what marks and symptoms is he to know whether it really is or is not going on within him, as he is forced to say it is? How does he feel, now that the Holy Ghost is *sanctifying* him? How is it that he would feel, if no such operation were going on within him?

Too often does it happen to him, in some shape

or other, to commit *sin*; or something which he is told and regarded to believe is *sin*: an event which cannot fail to be frequently, not to say continually, taking place, if that be true, which in the Liturgy we are all made so decidedly to confess and assert,—viz. that we are all—all of us without exception—so many “*miserable sinners*?” In the *School-room*, doing what by this Catechism he is forced to do, saying what he is forced to say, the child thus declares himself, notwithstanding, a *sanctified* person. From thence going to church, he confesses himself to be no better than “*a miserable sinner*.” If he is not always this miserable sinner, then why is he always forced to say he is? If he is always this same miserable sinner, then this sanctification, be it what it may, which the Holy Ghost was at the pains of bestowing upon him, what is he the better for it?

The child, into whose mouth these words are forced, does he not so much as suppose himself to feel going on within him any process, to which the word *sanctification* can be applied? If *not*, then what is it that this same *sanctification* means? and why is it that he is made to speak of the Holy Ghost, as performing or having performed it upon him, when he feels not any such thing, nor knows any thing about the matter?

Does he then feel or suppose any such particular operation going on within him? If so, then must this sanctification be the receiving of that inward light, which certain of the people called *Methodists* take upon them to speak of themselves as feeling within themselves. By the rulers of the Church and their adherents, these *Methodists* are spoken of as *schismatics*, and a species of he-

retics. Quere, such reprobation, how is it consistent with the declaration thus expressed and included in this Catechism?

To be *sanctified* is to be made *holy*. By the child, be he who he may, sooner or later, this point of information will have been received, if it has not been already. While giving this answer, *does the child then feel itself holy?*—If *not*, then why is it to be forced to say it does? If *yes*, then is it already a *Methodist* child: an arrant *Methodist*.

Question 6th.—You said that your Godfathers and Godmothers did promise for you that you should keep God's commandments. Tell me how many there be.

Answer.—Ten.

Question 7th.—Which be they?

Answer.—The same which God spake in the twentieth chapter of Exodus, saying, I am the Lord thy God, who brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage.

1. Thou shalt have none other Gods but me.

☞ Thereupon follow the other nine of these commandments.

OBSERVATIONS.

Upon the face of this introduction, an appearance rather unfortunate presents itself. The child in question is not a Jew: neither he nor any of his forefathers were ever, in the manner thus alluded to, "*brought out of the land of Egypt.*" But it is to the Jews, and to that race alone,—to those, and the progeny of those, who were thus brought out of the land of Egypt—that these Commandments are any where in the Bible represented as having been delivered.

How far, by a person professing the religion of Jesus, they ought to be considered as binding upon

him, is a subject of controversy, upon which it is not proposed to enter in this place.

One observation however there is, which, even in this place, claims admission,—and *that* by a title which it seems not easy to dispute. This is—that, in a discourse, which is intended for the instruction of *Christian* children, and which has for one of its objects the causing these Commandments to be regarded as binding upon Christians, it seems not altogether congruous to that design to employ a form of words, upon the face of which it appears that no person, not being of Jewish lineage, and at the same time of the Jewish persuasion in matters of religion, and therefore no child for whose use this formulary was intended, is of the number of the persons to whom these Commandments were addressed.

In relation to this incongruity, what was the expectation, and consequent instruction, of the penners and establishers of this formulary?—that it *would* and *should*, or that it *would not* and *should not*, attract, in general, the notice, and engage the attention, of those who were destined to be impregnated with it?—impregnated with the *matter*, or at any rate, with the *words* of it? *If yes*, then the expectation and intention was,—that, by those, by whom the words of this formulary were got by heart, no reliance should be placed in the *words*, of which it was composed; but that for the sense of it, they were to refer themselves to whatever construction the person, to whose guidance it was meant they should stand subjected, might at any time be pleased to put upon it:—*if no*, then the expectation and intention was,—that in this part at least—(and if in *this* part, how should it be

otherwise in any *other*?) the place it occupied in men's minds would and should be that of an insignificant assemblage of words:—of mere words, not accompanied by correspondent ideas, and therefore not capable of exercising any influence on human practice;—on the conduct of those upon whose memories it was to be impressed.

But, in relation to this matter, let the *expectation* and *intention* have been what they may, what is likely to be the *effect*? The incongruity, *will it* be perceived? then in so far will the unfitness of this formulary for its purpose be perceived. The incongruity, *will it not* be perceived? it will then be, because,—in this particular part, as in the whole together,—it is not of a nature to take on the understanding any efficient hold, nor therefore to produce on life and conduct any beneficial effect.

Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven image, nor the likeness of any thing that is in heaven above, or in the earth beneath, or in the waters under the earth.

OBSERVATIONS.

Upon the face of this commandment, two branches of art and science stand condemned and prohibited; viz. the *graphic art* in all its various modifications; the graphic art, and thereby, in great measure, the science of *natural history*; two branches of art and science; and thereby, among *men*, those by whom those branches of art and science are respectively practised and cultivated: on the one hand, *painters* and other such *artists*—on the other hand, *natural philosophers*.

True it is that, immediately after the above, these are the words that follow:—“*Thou shalt not bow down to them, nor worship them.*” Well

then (it has been said) by this it appears, that in so far as concerns manual operation in any shape, in addition to the act of *bowing down to* and *worshipping them*, all that was meant to be included in the prohibition was, not simply the act of *making* the sorts of things in question, but the act of making them for the *purpose* in question: viz. that of their being *bowed down to* and *worshipped*.

Yes, verily: in this may be seen a signification, which must per force be put upon these words, in so far as a resolution has been previously taken, that whatsoever were the real meaning of the prohibitory clause, the act of *making*, as applied to the class of articles in question, shall not be *considered* as included in it.

But, upon the face of the words, as they here stand, is this the *true*, the *natural*, the *proper* sense of them? If so, then are the words designative of the sort of act first mentioned, viz. the act of *making*—then are the words—“*Thou shalt not make to thyself*”—to be considered as words void of meaning: then is the whole passage to be understood, as it would be if no such words were there.

But, for the taking of any such liberty with this passage, where is the sufficient warrant? If with *this* passage, that sort of liberty may be taken,—taken at pleasure, by any man who finds a convenience in so doing,—why not with any other, and every other?—This is the way that, now-a-days, so many religions are made. By omission, by insertion, by substitution—by *amendment* in every shape—a man makes a Bible of his own; and thereupon, with intimations given of

divine vengeance in case of refractoriness, he calls upon mankind to bow down and worship it.

The writer, inspired or not inspired, by whom this passage was originally penned, was he so much less skilled in the import and management of his own language, as not to be able to give expression to a prohibition, which he *did* intend *should* take effect,—not to be able to give expression to this prohibition, without adding to it another and still more extensive,—and that a useless and pernicious one,—which he *did not intend* should take effect? Inspired or uninspired, had he not foresight enough to foresee (and surely no such gift as that of supernatural prophecy was necessary to enable a man to foresee) that such as is here contended for would be the signification put upon these words,—and in consequence to do what was so perfectly easy to do, for preventing any such sense from being put upon them, *viz.* to forbear inserting the words by which this supposed real intention was so plainly counteracted, and which could not be either necessary or conducive to any other purpose than that of counteracting it.

In truth, according to the plain and only natural import of the words, here are two sorts of acts, perfectly distinct from and unconnected with each other, that are successively taken for the objects of so many successive prohibitory clauses. *One* is—the act of *worshipping* the natural objects therein described, the *other* is—the act of *making* visible representations of these same objects.

True it is, that it is not in *this* order that the

two prohibitions follow one another: it is in the reverse order: the prohibition of *making* any likenesses of the objects in question—this is the prohibition that happens here to have been first. And in this collocation it is—in the relative position thus given to these two prohibitive clauses, which in this their situation are, however, upon the face of them, no less completely independent of one another, than in the opposite situation they would have been—in this circumstance, insignificant as it is, may be seen the only shadow of pretence that could be found for a change so violent—for a misrepresentation so manifest.

All this while, as every body knows in this country, in which the religion of Jesus is not only professed, but established, and even forced upon men by law,—under the same law the *making of graven images* is not only practised and allowed, but by public authority encouraged; as well as in all other imaginable ways, “the likenesses” of all sorts of things that are “in heaven above, or in the earth beneath, or in the water (whatsoever there is of it that is) under the earth.” In this state of law and universal practice, while such as above is manifestly the import of this commandment,—a commandment, exhibiting not only in the character of a *divine* one, but of a divine one, binding not only upon the Jews, to whom it was delivered, but upon Christians, to whom it was not delivered,—is it not deplorable, that, in this country in particular, every Christian belonging to the established religion, should thus be forced to declare his resolution to keep this commandment along with the rest;—this commandment, which no

such Christian ever *does* keep, or entertain so much as a thought of keeping? or, except in and by this formulary, addressed to young children only, is ever called upon to keep?

To engage in any such task as that of writing a commentary on this Jewish code, forms not any part of the design of the present tract. That part of this Catechism, which is composed of the remaining eight of these commandments, has therefore been omitted.

Question 8.—What dost thou chiefly learn by these commandments?

Answer.—I learn two things : my duty towards God, and my duty towards my neighbour.

OBSERVATIONS.

Of a *commentary*, be the subject what it may, a proper,—and (it should seem) where, as here, censure is out of the question, the only proper,—use is—in so far as the text is, either with reference to all persons in general, or with reference to a particular description of persons, for whose use the commentary is intended, less perspicuous than might have been wished, to clear away the ambiguity or obscurity;—to wit, by bringing to view what, upon the consideration of the whole, presents itself as the true meaning—the meaning intended by the person of whose discourse the text is composed.

On a subject such as the present, if,—besides exhibiting the meaning which it was in the mind and intention of the author of the original work to convey,—the author of the accessory work in question takes upon himself to draw inferences of his own, in so far it is rather a *sermon* than a

commentary. Be that as it may, in this case what he ought to do is—carefully to avoid confounding with the consecrated ground-work his own unconsecrated inference: and, in particular, in giving expression to his own inference, he ought to employ for that purpose other words of his own, chosen by himself for that same purpose; and not any such words of the original text, as will have the effect of causing this inference of his to be regarded not as his inference, but as so much matter already and actually included in the text; i. e. as constituting a part of that meaning, which, by means of that text, it had been the intention of the author to convey to his expected readers.

Taken on the footing of an *independent* proposition, that in the main, at this time of day, it would be for the benefit of a professor of the religion of Jesus, to regard the above described duties as so many duties incumbent on himself, is not here less meant to be represented as a matter open to dispute. But that, in the character of an *inference*—an inference drawn from the tenor of the code here in question, any such proposition is correct, can not be admitted. The Jews—they and they alone—were the people to whom this code was addressed. In addressing himself, whether to his hearers or his readers, those, and those alone, were the people, which, on this occasion, could have been present to the mind of Moses, in such sort as to be considered as the people, with reference to whom the word *neighbour* was to be understood. But in those days, and on that occasion, who was *the neighbour of a Jew*? In general, every other Jew:

but most assuredly no person other than a Jew. On that occasion, had the benefit of these commandments been meant to be extended to men in general, the word correspondent to the word *man*, and *not* the word correspondent to the word *neighbour*, would have been the word employed. If by *Moses*, of all men; men *in general*—all men without distinction—had been meant, what should have been *his* inducement to discard this most obvious of all words, and substitute to it a different word, the effect of which, in so far as any effect is given to it, is—to designate, to the exclusion of the whole remainder of the species, a comparatively minute portion of it.

Neighbour being a *relative* term—a word of *reference*—no sooner is the *object* of reference changed, than, in this new case, it comes to be designative of a set of persons altogether different from those which in the first instance it was employed to designate. The sort of person, who, during the penning of the text, was in contemplation under the word *neighbour*, could be no other than a *Jew*. But, at this time of day, in so far as the word *neighbour* is used in its only proper sense, no Jew is the neighbour, much less the *only* sort of neighbour, of any child into whose mouth this formulary is forced. True it is that, when *Jesus* comes, he is represented as making *an amendment* to this code: declaring, on that occasion, that, by every one of *his* followers, not *Jews* alone, but every other man without exception, should, to the purpose of receiving the benefits proffered by him, be considered in the character of a *neighbour*. With this explanation, true it is that, to the particular purpose in ques-

tion, in the vocabulary of a follower of Jesus, the word *neighbour* becomes synonymous to the word *man*:—understand with this explanation, given as it was by *Jesus*. But, to the explanation and extension, thus, at so vast a distance of time after the issuing of this code, given to it by *Jesus*, no reference is, in this formulary, to be found. In it the neighbour of the *Christian* is represented as being at all times the same sort of person as was the neighbour of the *Jew* in *Moses'* time; and the one as well as the other, as being the same sort of person as is designated by the word *man* at all times. Accordingly, presently after, *viz.* in the answer to the next question but one, the expression *all men* is slipt in,—and, without notice, is employed in the place of *neighbour*: as if the two words had all along the same meaning: and thus, instead of the clear light in which the whole matter might so easily have been placed, it is wrapt up in confusion and darkness.

Question 9.—What is thy duty towards God?

Answer.—My duty towards God is to believe in him, to fear him, and to love him with all my heart, with all my mind, with all my soul, and with all my strength; to worship him, to give him thanks, to put my whole trust in him, to call upon him, to honour his holy name and his word, and to serve him truly all the days of my life.

OBSERVATIONS.

On the subject of this answer, not a few are the questions that present themselves:—the questions, pregnant, all of them, with doubts, if not with objections,—some of them chargeable, as it should seem, with impertinence. But as the suggestions conveyed by them have not for their result any imputation on the *morality* of the dis-

course;—as, supposing them well grounded, nothing beyond its character for wisdom is affected by them,—to frame the answers is a task that will be left altogether to the reader: nor, upon any of the subjects thus touched upon, will any more words be employed than what have been found absolutely necessary for giving expression to the questions themselves.

1. Belief in God? what is it that is here meant by it? belief that God *exists*, or any thing, and what else?

2. Belief—an act of the understanding—ought it to be, or can it be made subject to the determination of the will?

3. If, in the mind in question, the existence of God is *already* the subject matter of *belief*, what need can there be to take it for a subject of *obligation*?—to rank it among *duties*?

4. If it be not, where can be the *effective ground*—the cause of fulfilment—in the case of the *obligation* thus supposed? Of what sort of matter can any such ground be composed?

5. In regard to *love*, on the supposition that, to the person in question, the object in question is not only an object of *fear*, but of a fear which is altogether boundless, in this case, of any such affection as is expressed by the word *love*, is the real existence, or any thing but the name and profession, compatible with such fear?

6. In particular, any such sentiment or affection as *love*, is it, in such a place as the human breast, producible by, or so much as compatible with, all this *straining*.

7. Wherein, except in words, consists on this

occasion the difference between *heart* and *mind*, and *soul* and *strength*?

8. By this accumulation of words, thus heaped one upon another, is any other idea conveyed than that of the extreme difficulty of the task thus endeavoured to be imposed, viz. the task of *loving*?

9. Any such affection as that called love, where it really has place, does it ever happen to it to have for its accompaniment any such idea as that of *difficulty*?

10. Be the object what it may, be to whom the idea of *loving* it presents any such idea as that of difficulty, can he with truth be said to *love* it?

11. In the case of a young child—not to speak of maturer age—does it seem likely that, by all these words, any such *straining* should frequently be produced?

12. Supposing it produced, does it seem likely that any real good effects, with relation either to his own happiness, or to the happiness of those whose lot may have placed them within the field of his influence, will result from it?

13. Be the person who he may, a determination on his part to put his *whole* trust in God, is it, if carried into effect, compatible with the practice of putting any *part* of his trust in the known and perpetually experienced and unquestionable operation and efficiency of *second* causes?

14. A *total*, or even considerable, though it were but *partial*, disregard to the operation of such *second* causes, would it be in any degree compatible with personal safety—with the preservation of health, of life, or of any thing that is worth preserving, whether to the individual him-

self, or to any other person or persons whose lot it may be to stand in need of his assistance?

15. The exertions thus required, and per force undertaken to be employed, in the endeavour to serve that *Being*, to whom all human service is "*unprofitable*,"* might they not with more profit be directed to the service of those weak creatures, whose need, of all the service that can be rendered to them, is at all times so urgent and so abundant?

Question 10.—What is thy duty towards thy neighbour?

Answer.—My duty towards my neighbour, is to love him as myself, and to do to all men as I would they should do unto me. To love, honour, and succour my father and mother. To honour and obey the king, and all that are put in authority under him. To submit myself to all my governors, teachers, spiritual pastors and masters. To order myself lowly and reverently to all my betters. To hurt nobody by word or deed. To be true and just in all my dealings. To bear no malice nor hatred in my heart. To keep my hands from picking and stealing, and my tongue from evil speaking, lying, and slandering. To keep my body in temperance, soberness, and chastity. Not to covet nor desire other men's goods; but to learn and labour, truly to get mine own living, and to do my duty in that state of life, unto which it shall please God to call me.

OBSERVATIONS.

Of this long and wordy formulary, had the whole contents been of a piece with the answer thus given to this question, assuredly it would never have been taken for the subject of a commentary, wearing any such complexion as that of

* Luke xvii. 10.—So likewise ye, when ye shall have done all those things which are commanded you, say, we are unprofitable servants; we have done that which was our duty to do.

the present, or having any such conclusions for its result and practical inference.

Throwing out the greater part, or the whole of the rest, adding or not adding any thing in the place of the matter thus discarded,—were it proposed to retain the substance of this answer, some such little changes might perhaps be suggested, as need not despair of being received in the character of *amendments*. But, taken even as it stands, especially when consideration is had of the age in which it was penned, and above all, when comparison is made of it with the whole remainder of that of which it forms a part,—so beautiful does it appear, that the eye shrinks from any such task, as that of travelling over it in search of imperfections.

Question 10, (put immediately after *the Lord's Prayer*).
—What desirest thou of God in this prayer?

Answer.—I desire my Lord God our heavenly Father, who is the giver of all goodness, to send his grace (1) unto me, and to all people.

OBSERVATIONS.

(1). [*Grace*.]—Here is the Prayer; and in the whole tenor of it, from beginning to end, about any such thing or word as *grace*, not so much as a single syllable.

The misrepresentation thus made, is it an innocent one? On the mind of every man by whom this formulary is regarded as unexceptionable, the effect of it—is it not—in conjunction with so many other causes which the same formulary sets to work,—to contribute towards the reconciling him to that convenient laxity of interpretation, which among religionists is so unhap-

pily frequent,—and, with relation to all worldly interests, so convenient?

A subject-matter, of which every body sees that no mention is made in this Prayer—this subject-matter, a child, who sees that it is *not* there, is made to declare—to declare in the face of a clergyman, or other person, under whom he is passing this examination,—and who, as well as he, sees that it is *not* there,—to declare, and to declare most solemnly, that it *is* there.

The lesson thus forced into every Church-of-England mouth, suppose it to be productive of any fruits whatsoever,—is it possible that, under such instruction, a rooted and habitual depravation of the mental faculties, intellectual and moral, should not be of the number of those fruits? To repeat as if it were true that which with his own eyes he sees to be untrue, this is what from infancy a child is compelled to practise—this is what he is made to reckon among the number of his *duties*.

In addition to *grace*, another of the *things* which, they not being in this Prayer, the pupil is thus forced to declare himself to have found in it, is *death—everlasting death*.—Of *everlasting death*, what mention is there in this Prayer of Jesus?—Not any: nor yet so much as of what is commonly meant by *death*. Of *evil*, yes: and death (it may be said) everlasting death—is not this an evil?—Doubtless: at least if by *death* be meant—not the absence of all sufferance, but sufferance itself. But if this were a sufficient warrant for making the child say that Jesus spoke of *death*, when no such word as *death* is to be

found in what he said, so would it be for speaking of all other things, one after another, to which, with any propriety, the word *evil* could be applied, and thereupon saying of each, that Jesus had spoken of it.

As to *grace* on this occasion, as on so many others—not to say *all* others—it is a mere *expletive*; adding nothing to the sense. Yet upon the ground of this expletive, systems have been built, controversies raised, swords drawn, and blood made to flow in torrents.

But of this disastrous expletive, more will be seen presently; viz. when the modern inventions, called *Sacraments*, come to be laid upon the table.

Question 11.—How many Sacraments hath Christ ordained in his Church?

Answer.—Two only (1), as generally necessary to salvation: that is to say, *Baptism* (2), and the *Supper of the Lord* (3).

OBSERVATIONS.

(1). [*Two only.*]—Of the word *only*, the use—so all commentators are agreed—was to put an exclusion upon a parcel of other ceremonies to which this revolted Church, the Church of England, had found the name of *sacrament* attached by the original Church from which she broke loose.

But as to *Christ*, the question being how many *sacraments* hath Christ ordained, the true answer would have been—none. For on what occasion, in the only language in which he spoke, is he represented as having employed any word to which the word *sacrament*, taken from the Latin *sacramentum*, corresponds in this our language?

Sacrament? what is it but a word of modern invention—a sort of metaphysical term, having certainly for its effect, probably for its object, the

causing to be regarded as mysterious, two operations, in neither of which there was any mystery,—to be regarded as having a connexion with each other—and that connexion fraught with mystery—two objects, between which no such connexion, nor any connexion at all, had been established by Jesus.

(2). [1. *Baptism*].—This operation was a *ceremony*: a ceremony, having for its object the serving to establish, and upon occasion bring to mind, the fact of a man's having been aggregated into the society formed by Jesus: the religious society, of which—God or man, or both in one,—he was the teacher and the head.

In an unlettered community it was a sort of substitute for an entry in a *register* or *memorandum book*. By a too natural misconception, the mere *sign* or *evidence* of this aggregation was taken for the *efficient cause* of the benefits produced by it. Thereupon came questions, out of number, about the circumstances by which it should be accompanied:—1. whether the application of the water should be *total* or *partial*?—2. if partial, what fingers should be employed in it?—3. and what the *form* should be that should be given to the wet mark made by it? &c. &c.*

* In the Russian Empire, by differences on this ground, persecutions and disastrous civil wars have been kindled. By the sect, which, in the sixteenth century, under the name of *Anabaptists*, to the determination of performing the humectation in the *total* way, as it was performed by Jesus, added other particulars, some of which were not only absurd but deplorably mischievous—peculiarities not regarding ceremony but morals—prodigious were the miseries inflicted and suffered.

the principle of *nullity*—that inexhaustible source of uncertainty in all its excruciating shapes—that prime instrument of fraud and rapine—being borrowed from technical jurisprudence, and in the character of a necessary *consequence*, attached to every deviation from the arbitrarily imagined and endlessly diversified standard of rectitude. In the same spirit, had the literary, and more durable expedient of a *Register-book* been employed, questions might have been started—whether, for the validity of the appointment, the *quill* should be a *goose-quill* or a *crow-quill*; the *paper*, *demy* or *foolscap*; the *binding*, *calf* or *sheep*.

Christ *ordain* Baptism under the name and character of a *Sacrament*? If by *ordain* is meant the same as by *institute*—the same as *the having been the first to practise*, or *cause to be practised*,—he did not so much as *ordain* it in the character of a *ceremony*. Practise it indeed he did, and afterwards cause it to be practised. But, before he practised it, or caused it to be practised by or upon any one else, he submitted to have it practised upon himself, after it had been practised already upon multitudes. By John it had already been practised upon multitudes, before it was practised by him upon Jesus.—Those who are forced to say this Catechism, why are they so much as suffered to read the New Testament? Can they read it without seeing this?

By whomsoever first invented and put in practice,—in its character of a succedaneum to an entry in a *Register-book*, it was an operation in every respect well imagined. In the country in which it was thus practised, heat was plenty,

water scarce, writing and reading still scarcer, money not over plenty. Baptism,—whether by dipping, by sprinkling, or by both,—was then and there a pleasant operation. Wherever either a river ran, or a lake stood, it cost nothing. John took no surplice fees. Jesus took no surplice fees. Whenever the existence of the Devil is fully proved, it will be proved that by that Ghost it was that these priests' fees were instituted, exactly at the same time with Judges' fees. Surplice fees are unknown in Scotland. By the Church of England only, not by the Church of Scotland, do the poor behold the gates of heaven shut against them.

Question 12.—What meanest thou by the word Sacrament?

Answer.—I mean an outward and visible sign of an inward and spiritual grace, given unto us, ordained by Christ himself, as a means whereby we receive the same, and a pledge to assure us thereof.

OBSERVATIONS.

Here, as already observed—here may be seen another example,—shewing how a semblance of something may be manufactured out of nothing. Two transactions—the performance of the ceremony of *Baptism*, and the utterance of a few words, stated as having been uttered by Jesus on the occasion of a supper at which he was present—two transactions,—which, unless it be the identity of the person who bore the principal part in both, had nothing at all in common,—forced into conjunction; and a generic appellation—the *sacrament*—made to serve, as it were, for a box, for inclosing them, and keeping them together.—*Sacrament*? by whom was this word in-

vented and made? By *Jesus*?—no more than it was by *Satan*. When thus made, what is the meaning given to this Rome-sprung vocable? In the English, and other dialects of the Teutonic, it is rendered by *holy*: it is *the holy thing*. And a *holy thing*, what is it?—*Holiness*? the word *holiness*, what is meant by it? As a property belonging to the thing itself, be the thing what it may, just nothing. By a thing—by any thing whatsoever, of which, by the principle of association, the idea has happened to become connected with the idea of the Almighty Creator,—a connexion of which any one created thing is, and ever has been, just as capable as any other,—by any thing—by every thing to which any such accident has happened, is this mysterious property thus acquired.

Thus then—such has been the course taken by the manufacturing process—by the invention of this so much worse than useless generic term, a branch of false science—a portion of wayward school logic—has been manufactured. Being made to pass examination in this science, the unfledged parrot takes in the words that are forced into its mouth, and declares itself to *understand*, where there is nothing to be understood.

Under the name of “*a grace*,” a something—and that something “*good*”—given unto us—given to every body—given alike to every man, whatsoever be his conduct—given as a thing of course,—by the mere ceremony: a pretended something, which, when examined by an unsophisticated eye, turns out to be in itself exactly nothing,—and even by the name thus given to it,

is but a sign,—yet, by the description at this same time given of it, it is an *efficient cause*!

The Almighty laid hold of, and made to enter into a contract (under what penalty is not mentioned) pledging himself, binding himself, to give to this pretended *efficient cause* a pretendedly *real effect*! Thus it is that the sham science grows: thus it is that the wilderness is formed, in which the wits of those who are destined to travel in it, are destined to be lost.

Question 13th.—How many parts are there in a sacrament?

Answer.—Two: the outward visible sign, and the inward spiritual grace.

OBSERVATIONS.

A compound made out of a *real* and *visible ceremony*, to which, by the force of imagination, is attached an *invisible* and *unintelligible effect*—such is the *whole*: and now comes the unfledged parrot, and with his tongue is required to split it into two parts.

Question 14th.—What is the outward visible sign, or form in Baptism?

Answer.—Water (1); wherein the person is baptized (2) in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost (3).

OBSERVATIONS.

(1).—Water the sign? No:—of itself water is not the sign of the thing in question—i. e. the transaction here in question—or of any thing else. Of the transaction in question, viz. aggregation to the society in question, the sign was a *physical operation*: not water itself, but the *application* of that liquid to the body of the person

aggregated. For preserving the memory of the transaction in question,—instead of a transient operation, such as was the application of water to the body in question, suppose the object employed to have been an *entry* in a *Baptism book*:—of the transaction in question what would have been the sign?—not the *leaf* of the book in its *blank* state, but the *mark made—the words written*—on that leaf.

In itself nothing can be more trifling than such an inaccuracy: the real matter of regret is—that in this body of pretended instruction, composed by a man who understood not what he wrote, a child should be forced to declare himself to understand, that which, neither to himself nor any one else, is any thing better than unintelligible.

(2). “Wherein the person is baptized”—not *wherewith*, but *wherein*—Alas! alas! what a scene of horror presents itself to view! The baptism then must be by immersion—by a thorough dipping—or it is no baptism. The whole ceremony—all *null and void*! Of the myriads in a year, who, under the Church of England discipline, are *said* to be baptized, how many are the *really* baptized?—Not one!

All, all of us heathens! all a prey to Satan!—all children of wrath! (so we shall see the next answer saying)—all “alive to sin!”—all “dead to righteousness!”—the best works we ever do, or can do, no better than so many sins!!!

(3). [*In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.*].—Here we have a short string of sounds—sounds that are in use to per-

form the office of *names*—and, by the texture thus given to a mouthful of air, note well the effects produced! a human being rescued or not rescued from a state of endless torment! And, to such an operation, in the character of a *cause*,—by whom—by what—have such effects been attached?—By the deluded or deluding imaginations of a set of presumptuous and domineering men.—Under the name of *magic*, or some such name, state the same conceit as issuing from a heathen brain,—execration or derision, instead of awe and veneration, are the sentiments it calls forth.

Question 15th.—What is the inward and spiritual grace?

Answer.—A death unto sin, and a new birth unto righteousness; for being by nature born in sin, and the children of wrath, we are hereby made the children of grace.

OBSERVATIONS.

Note well the sort of story that is here told.—The Almighty God,—maker of all things visible and “invisible”—“of heaven and earth, and all that therein is”—makes, amongst other things, a child; and no sooner has he made it, than he is “*wrath*” with it for being made. He determines accordingly to consign it to a state of endless torture. Meantime comes somebody,—and, pronouncing certain words, applies the child to a quantity of water, or a quantity of water to the child. Moved by these words, the all-wise Being changes his design; and, though he is not so far appeased as to give the child its pardon, vouchsafes to it a *chance*—no one can say *what* chance—of ultimate escape.—And this is what the child gets by being “made”—and we see in what way made—“*a child of grace.*”

Thereupon comes the sort of *wit*, ghostly and ghastly, which, on such occasions, has been so plentifully played off: there we have *death*, and here we have *new birth*: death unto sin, new birth unto righteousness. And in this wit we have a subject—not merely for *admiration*, but moreover for *belief*:—for belief, of the withholding of which, as if it were in the power of every man to believe or not believe what he pleased, the consequence is—what at every turn, and upon every occasion, stares us in the face—a state of endless torture.

Question 16th.—What is required of persons to be baptized?

Answer.—Repentance, whereby they forsake sin; and faith, whereby they stedfastly believe the promises of God made to them in that sacrament.

OBSERVATIONS.

Obvious indeed are the observations suggested by this answer. But forasmuch as by the next question these observations are themselves undertaken to be obviated, let this next question, with the answers which it is employed to call forth, be first heard.

Question 17th.—Why then are infants baptized, when, by reason of their tender age, they cannot perform them?

Answer.—Because they promise them both by their sureties: which promise, when they come to age, themselves are bound to perform.

OBSERVATIONS.

[Perform *them*?]—Perform *what*?—Here may be seen a cloud of obscurity and ambiguity, derived from a sort of source—a purely grammatical one—such as in a composition so highly elaborated, and so abundantly examined, would not

naturally have been looked for. Of such things as are in their nature capable of being "*performed*," the *last* thing mentioned,—not to say the only thing,—is what is brought to view by the word *promises*. Yet, on a little reflection, these things, viz. *promises*, (it will be seen) can not be among the things here in view.—Why?—Answer—Because *God* is the person *by* whom these promises were stated as being made. But, not even in such a composition as *this*, can it have been supposed or pretended, that when *God* is the person by whom a promise is made, the person by whom that promise is to be performed is an infant.—An infant? Yea, a *just-born infant*:—the time allowed for performance being no longer than the interval between its birth and the age at which baptism is commonly administered: an interval commonly of between a week and a fortnight.

Look a little forwards however, and then a little backwards, and it will be sufficiently clear that, though the *things* to be performed are indeed *promises*, yet the *person, by whom* they are to be performed, is—not the least antecedent, viz. *God*, but the *infant*: the infant who is considered as the subject of the operation in question, viz. *baptism*. Why not *God* but the infant?—Answer, for this plain reason:—because the acts which are held up to view in the character of subjects of *promise* are "*Faith and Repentance*;" to wit, the Faith and Repentance above spoken of.

It is not, however, without some violence to *grammar*—some violation of the *rules* of grammar—that the language is here reconcileable to the rules of common sense. The *number* employed in the 16th question is the *singular* number.—"What

is required:" the number employed in the 17th question, by which, with its answer, the answer to that 16th question is undertaken to be explained, is the *plural* number: "*Perform them,*" says the 17th question: promise *them*, says the answer to it. And this promise *them*; of what is it the representative? Why—as turns out immediately after—of two things. Here then, between question the 16th (i. e. the question, to which, it being, and with so much reason, considered, that explanation is wanting, explanation, such as we see, is accordingly given)—between this 16th question and question 17th (i. e. the question employed to explain it) a contradiction exhibits itself. Believe the *explained* question, there is but *one* thing required: believe the *explaining* question, there are two things—two very different things, both, required: viz. the *faith* and the *repentance*. These are the *them* which, viz. by *their sureties*, the children *promised*: these are the *them* which, viz. by *themselves*, they are to perform. For so it is, that according to this law and this divinity, they themselves are thus to be sureties for their own sureties.

From the grammatical, return we now to the religious ground: and thereon to what remains of the task which the poor child has to go through with.

Two things, as above, he is required to do: and *that* because once upon a time, without knowing any thing about the matter, he promised to do them: *he* promised, that is, *other people* did, which comes to the same thing. These things are—to *repent* of *sin*, whether he has committed

any or no: and to believe,—and that “stedfastly,” whatever he may think of it,—what, for that purpose, is thereupon put into his hands. This is—that when, a few days after his birth, the Clergyman threw a little water on his face,—saying over him at the same time a few words without a meaning,—God was all the while making him *promises*, which promises might however as well have not been made, since nobody has so much as pretended to know what they were.

Another task, which his believing faculty is, at the same time, put to,—though without any express mention of it,—consists in the believing bad *principles* to be good *principles*, and bad *reasons* good *reasons*.

Example of bad *principles*:—that it is in the power of any *three* persons, two of them being of the one sex and one of the other, by making, in the name of a new-born infant, a parcel of *promises*, to saddle it with a load of *obligations*: amongst others, that of believing,—how incredible soever, when the time comes, they may appear to him,—things upon things, which, had he not been thus saddled, he could *not* have believed.

Example of bad *reasons*:—that a man’s having taken upon him to promise, that a child shall believe so and so, affords any reason for the child’s believing as much, or so much as trying to believe it.

The point of *time*, at which these two exploits are to be performed—in this may be seen a point, in relation to which, if the babes and sucklings should, any of them, succeed in forming to themselves any thing like a clear conception, they will

have done more than seems to have been done by the sages, by whom this task has been thus put into their hands.

“*What is required of persons AFTER they have been baptized?*” Had the question stood thus, the meaning would have been clear enough. Thus, however, it unfortunately does not stand: instead of so doing, it stands thus:—“*What is required of persons TO BE baptized?*” In this way of putting it, the child’s having done these things, that are thus “required” of him, is what, in the language of lawyers, is called *a condition precedent* to his being baptized. These things, then, which he is to do before he is baptized—that is, before he is a *fortnight*, or perhaps before he is a *week* old—what are they?—The question has been already answered. He is to *repent*—to repent of the sins which, in nobody can say what numbers, in his way from the breast to the cradle and back again, he has already committed: and he is to believe—to believe with all his might, all the fine things which for that purpose have been provided. All this while, if so it be, that a child, almost as soon as born, may *promise* by proxy, why not *repent* and *believe* by proxy? The sponsors, when they have *promised* for him, why not as well *perform* for him? Having undertaken for the *performances*, as they are all along called,—viz. a quantity of *repentance*, and moreover, a quantity of *faith*,—who so proper as *they* to execute these several performances?

To a child of a week or a fortnight old, the finding sins of its own to repent of, may not be altogether so easy a task, as on this occasion seems to have been supposed:—To the good men

and woman, or the good man and women, by whom all these promises are made for it, the matter may, every now and then at least, be a matter of much less difficulty.

The *order* in which these same two performances are required and expected to succeed one another;—in this may be seen another *exemplification* of the muddiness of the fountain from which all this instruction flowed. In the natural course of things, the *motive* comes before the *act*. If the course here prescribed were to be pursued, the *act* would take the lead: and then, with a manifestation of humility, of which any example would not easily be found elsewhere, up comes in the train of it the generating and directing *motive*. According to the scheme of Jesus, faith was of course every where the seed, repentance one of the fruits of it: it was because a man believed—expected to experience the eventual fulfilment of the threats and promises held out to him—it was because a man believed that he was to repent,—not because he repented, that he was to believe.

Into the conception of any man besides this *Catechism-maker*, did any such idea ever enter, as that of addressing threats and promises to a man, to no other purpose than that of making him do what he had done already? But, if the mind, in which both these fruits were to be produced by the genial virtue of this ceremony, was a new-born infant's, either of them would be as ready to come forth as the other: and thus the *Catechism-maker* is justified.

Question 18th.—Why was the sacrament of the Lord's Supper ordained?

Answer.—For the continual remembrance of the sacrifice of the death of Christ, and of the benefits which we receive thereby.

OBSERVATIONS.

Of this answer,—keeping *in* that part for which a warrant is to be found in the text of the Gospel History, and leaving *out* of it that part which, no such warrant being to be found for it, has been the work of imagination,—inserting at the same time such words of limitation as may be necessary to confine the proposition within the limits designated by the sacred text,—of this answer the purport might (it should seem) have stood thus expressed:—"For the continual remembrance . . . of the death of Christ," to be preserved in the minds of such of his disciples as,—having been admitted by him into a state of peculiar intimacy, and, from time to time, sent out by him, from place to place, to preach his doctrine,—became distinguished by the appellation of his "*Apostles*:"—*Apostles*, in the Greek (the only language in which the Gospel History, or any part of it, has been handed down to us) meaning neither more nor less than an *Emissary* or *Messenger*.

As to "*the benefits which we receive thereby*,"—what, in this Catechism, they are said to be—what the child is forced to say he believes them to be—will be seen presently.

Moreover, in the act of *receiving*, as brought to view by the word "*received*," is implied the act of *delivering*: as also, that he, by whom the act of delivering is to be performed, is a different person from him by whom the act of receiving is to be performed. A foundation being thus laid,—and that foundation having, in the words of the sacred

history, a sufficient support,—and that not exposed to dispute,—now comes the superstructure, which is the seat of the deception, and which has no such support. This is—that to the act of *delivering*, one sort of person and one alone, is competent: viz. *a Priest*: a person, on whom a corporeal ceremony has been performed: a ceremony from which a multitude of spiritual, supernatural, and mystical consequences are deduced:—the act of *receiving*—that alone is the *act*, whereunto, under the system, of which this Catechism makes a part, persons other than priests are competent: nor even to this are the profane multitude competent, but subject to *exceptions*, drawn out of an inexhaustible mine of exceptions, which has been opened for that purpose:—a mine capable, in its origin at least, of being dug into to any depth, which the interest of those who opened it could require.

And thus it is that, upon the ground of this *supper*, which, as the whole history declares, was neither more nor less than a mere social and farewell repast, taken with the utmost privacy;—a repast of which none were partakers, but the most confidential friends and disciples of the Master;—a repast, taken on the occasion of his foreseen and approaching fall;—upon this ground, and with so slender a stock of the most ordinary materials, has been erected a manufactory of *grace*:—of *grace*,—a commodity, which, being alike suited to every body's use, was to be sold to all who should be disposed to purchase it: a *manufactory*, carried on in different forms, under an imaginary perpetual patent, always for the benefit of the *patentees*.

Instead of domination for the purpose of degradation,—had useful instruction, and the melioration of moral disposition and conduct been the object,—and thereupon had some physical operation, performed by Jesus himself, and actually directed to that object, been looked out for, to be taken for a subject of imitation, and, for the above good purposes, converted into a ceremony,—in any such case, in the incident of the *feet-washing*, as related by Saint John, the founders of the Romish, and therein of the English Church, might have found what they wanted.

A little before the supper in question there was another; if indeed it was another, and not the same. Be this as it may, at the supper spoken of by *John* (by whom not the least intimation is given of the *bread-breaking*), the same select disciples being present, Jesus sees reason to give them a lesson of humility. He therefore in his own person and deportment sets them an example of that virtue. He insists on washing their feet. Put to shame by a manifestation so striking of a disposition with which their own formed so disadvantageous a contrast, Peter resists: vain however is all resistance, and, upon the feet of all the twelve, the operation is performed.

To give to this ceremony a real importance—a practical object, no arbitrary inferences—no additions—would have been necessary: never was design more plainly, more impressively expressed.*

• ST. JOHN, CHAP. XIII.

1. Now before the feast of the Passover, when Jesus knew that his hour was come that he should depart out of

While this comparatively insignificant one was sublimated into a *mystery*,—that really instructive

this world unto the father, having loved his own which were in the world, he loved them unto the end.

2. And supper being ended, the devil having now put into the heart of Judas Iscariot, Simon's son, to betray him;

3. Jesus knowing that the father had given all things into his hands, and that he was come from God and went to God;

4. He riseth from supper, and laid aside his garments; and took a towel, and girded himself.

5. After that he poured water into a bason, and began to wash the disciples' feet, and to wipe them with the towel wherewith he was girded.

6. Then cometh he to Simon Peter: and Peter said unto him, Lord, dost thou wash my feet?

7. Jesus answered and said unto him, what I do thou knowest not now; but thou shalt know hereafter.

8. Peter saith unto him, Thou shalt never wash my feet. Jesus answered him, if I wash thee not thou hast no part with me.

9. Simon Peter saith unto him, Lord, not my feet only, but also my hands, and my head.

10. Jesus saith unto him, he that is washed, needeth not, save to wash his feet, but is clean every whit; and ye are clean, but not all.

11. For he knew who should betray him; therefore, said he, ye are not all clean.

12. So after he had washed their feet, and had taken his garments, and was set down again, he said unto them, Know ye what I have done to you?

13. Ye call me master and Lord; and ye say well, for so I am.

14. If I, then, your Lord and master, have washed your feet; ye also ought to wash one another's feet.

15. For I have given you an example that ye should do as I have done to you.

16. Verily, verily, I say unto you, the servant is not greater than his Lord; neither he that is sent, greater than he that sent him.

17. If ye know these things, happy are ye if ye do them.

ceremony, how comes it to have been passed over in such profound neglect?—How?—why for three perfectly intelligible reasons :—

1. Because it gave, to the self-created order of official persons, no privilege, no peculiar advantage.

2. Because the lesson which it so plainly gives, is to them a lesson of condemnation.

3. Because, to the inventors of the *drinking ceremony*, drinking wine while others looked on, was an operation more pleasant than would have been the washing the feet of those same spectators.

Here then are two contiguous suppers—two farewell suppers—or two incidents, related as having had place at the same supper. By the one, a lesson is given—a lesson pregnant with instruction as plain as it is salutary,—and one, the applicability of which, and with it the utility, will endure as long as man endures. In the other, what is visible to every eye is—an incident, naturally interesting indeed in no mean degree to the individuals then present, but having neither interest nor meaning, as applied to any other individual ; nor of itself calculated or designed to convey instruction in any shape whatsoever.—The universally important transaction is passed over in universal silence and neglect,—the other is converted into a mystery, with damnation—universal damnation, or thereabouts—at the bottom of it!

Question 19.—What is the outward part or sign of the Lord's Supper ?

Answer.—Bread and Wine, which the Lord hath commanded to be received.

OBSERVATIONS.

[*Hath commanded to be received ?*]—Mark well

H

the misrepresentation of which this phrase is the chief instrument: seldom has a plan of misrepresentation been more subtly contrived.

Had the passage stood in these words, *Which the Lord . . . commanded to be received*, stood in these words, without the word *hath*,—the answer would, as far as it went, have been unobjectionable: as far as it went, it would have been conformable to the sacred text. Mark well—without the word *hath*: for in this short word lurks the poison—the seed of the deceit.

It is by this word *hath* that the transaction is represented as meant to be applied to the *indefinite present*: i. e. to every point of time, at which it shall have happened to this account of it to find a reader, and to every individual person, by whom, he being a believer in the religion of Jesus, it shall have happened to be heard or read.

Such is the conception, which, by the authors of this Catechism, composed in the sixteenth century after the birth of Jesus, is endeavoured to be impressed: viz. that to the effect just described, a command delivered by Jesus, in the intention of its being considered as obligatory,—obligatory with a force equal at least to that of any of his moral precepts,—was addressed to *all* persons, by whom the religion taught by him should come to be professed:—to *all* of them, without distinction, to the end of time.

Such is the conception which, by these men of yesterday, this part of the *history* of Jesus is represented as intended to convey. In the *history itself*, how is this same matter represented?

According to the history, who are the persons

present?—a numerous assembly, as at the delivery of the sermon on the *Mount*?—No:—but a chosen few, sitting with him in a private chamber: the twelve disciples, whose condition had been distinguished from that of the general body of his followers by marks of peculiar confidence, and whose life had been interwoven with his own by habits of peculiar intimacy.

“ Ever and anon, when I am no longer with you, and when after my departure it happens to you, to you the chosen among my disciples, to meet together on a convivial occasion as at present,—when the materials of the repast are before you, think of your departed master, think of this your last meeting (for such it will be) in my presence. Think of his now approaching death: think of the cause and fruit of it. When, for the purpose of the social repast, bread, such as that which I have thus broken, comes also to be broken, think of this body, which, for the part acted by me for your instruction, will, ere long, be broken and destroyed.”

“ When the wine, whatever it be that stands before you, comes to be poured out, let it call to your remembrance his blood which will have been shed in that same cause”

With this evident sense before them, will nothing satisfy men but the grossest nonsense? Of the multitude of figurative expressions, to which scanty and unformed languages in general—to which the Jewish language in particular, with its dialects—were necessitated, or at least were continually wont to have recourse,—is *this alone*, in

spite of the plainest common sense, to be understood in the literal sense?

That, in his own hand Jesus held his own body, but in the first instance without the blood belonging to it; and having, by breaking it into eleven or twelve pieces, converted each of those *parts* into the *whole*, gave those his eleven or twelve bodies, one to each guest—he himself, with or without his body, looking on all the while to see them eat it,—and thereupon, immediately after gave to each of them the whole of his blood, *viz.* the wine which had just been poured out, and by him converted into blood,—the bodies, into which the bread had been converted, not having any blood in them,—that of all these self-contradictory extravagances the existence should be more probable than that, on an impassioned occasion, Jesus should have made use of a figurative expression—and that too in a language which scarce offered any other? In a barbarous age, and thence, under the influence of blind caprice, even in a more improved age,—under the Roman Catholic edition of the religion of Jesus Yes: under such a system, in the admission given to any such style of interpretation, how little soever there may be of abstract reason, there is but too much of consistency.

But, under a government calling itself *Protestant*,—and oppressing *Catholics*, because they are Catholics, and, for these very extravagances, branding them with the name of *Idolaters*!

Believe that Jesus, having held his own body in his own hand, gave to each of twelve men, the whole of that same body, and then saw them eat

it, &c. &c.—Believe this, because Jesus is related to have said so?—Well then—(not to speak of a way*) believe that Jesus was a *door*—a door always open for as many men as pleased to “go *in and out*” *through it* :† for this too is among the things, which, in the same sacred books, it is related of him that he said. In the mouth of a Protestant, among Protestants, this argument, when addressed by them to Catholics, is relied on as conclusive. Conclusive? and against what? why, against this very cannibal story, of the truth of which every Church of England child is thus forced to declare itself persuaded.

Compared with this, the supposition about the *door* would be rational and probable. Consider *Bright* and *Lambert* : the least of these great men had quantity of matter enough in his body to admit of an aperture, through which, as through a door, a man of ordinary size might have passed without much difficulty. Believing and teaching the mystery of *Cannibalism*, will a man refuse to believe and teach this other mystery of the *door* ? If so, what will his faith avail him?—When bread and wine, and body and blood, and every thing else is swallowed, still, unless he will swallow the *door* likewise,—still, if he is consistent, he is an *unbeliever* ; he is still an *infidel*, and all that he has swallowed has been swallowed in waste.

* John xiv. 6. Jesus saith unto him, I am the *way*, the truth, and the life: no man cometh unto the father but through me.

† John x. 9. I am the *door* ; by me, if any man enter in, he shall be saved, and shall go in and out, and find pasture.

Question 20.—What is the inward part, or thing signified?

Answer.—The body and blood of Christ, which are verily and indeed taken, and received by the faithful in the Lord's Supper.

OBSERVATIONS.

Body and Blood, *without* the Bread and Wine, the Bread and Wine being metamorphosed into Body and Blood,—in the *pure* grimgribber of modern *technical* theology—in the theology of the *Roman* school—this is *transubstantiation*. Body and Blood, *with* the Bread and Wine—in the *adulterated* grimgribber—the produce of *Luther's* unmaturing attempts to throw off the load of pernicious rubbish heaped up by the Romish school—this is *consubstantiation*. In respect of absurdity, self-contradiction, and groundless inference,—between the *trans* and the *sub*, is there so much as a shade of difference worth thinking of? On the *con* plan the mess has more matter in it than in the *trans*: and the more the worse.

“*Verily and indeed!*”—Danger is here foreseen,—and, it being foreseen, provision is thus made against it:—the danger, lest, here or there, the stomach of this or that intractable and refractory child, should, in the midst of all this instruction, be tempted to listen, in preference, to the testimony of his own senses: lest, accordingly, not finding in his palate the taste and consistence of *flesh*, any more than, under his eyes, the colour of *blood*, he should thereupon, notwithstanding all *assurances*, and the threatenings that may be seen glittering in the back-ground, be perverse enough to harbour doubts of his own *Cannibalism*. Of the reiterated intensity of these *asseverations*,

the object is—to keep out, if possible, all such doubts.

Question 81.—What are the benefits whereof we are partakers thereby?

Answer.—The strengthening and refreshing of our souls by the body and blood of Christ, as our bodies are by the bread and wine.

OBSERVATIONS.

In itself, a puzzling one indeed is the question here. But—answers such as this—let *these* be received as answers, no question can be a puzzling one.—Souls refreshed by a body and a quantity of blood?—Oh yes: if the body were but a *metaphorical* body, the blood but *metaphorical* blood, and the refreshment but *metaphorical* refreshment, in that case there would be no difficulty. By that which is *metaphorical*, *any thing* may be done: Yes, *any thing*; for that which is *metaphorical* is—*any thing*. But the body—is it then a metaphorical body?—Not it indeed. It is the *real* body: the blood is the *real* blood;—or how could they be “*verily and indeed taken?*” the *refreshment*, which a true Church of England soul takes by the *eating* of this *body*, and the *drinking* of this blood, is either no refreshment at all, or it is the same refreshment, that the soul of a New Zealander takes when he has been fortunate in battle: when, as a clergyman of the New Zealand religion, whatever it be, would phrase it,—“the Lord has delivered the enemy into his hand.”

Nay, but it is only by that part of the meal which is composed of the bread and the wine, that our bodies (says somebody), are here said to be “*refreshed.*”—True: but the *body* and the *blood*

are not the less said to be *taken*: i. e. taken, if into any thing, into our bodies: "*verily*, (lest any thing like doubt on the subject should be suffered to remain)—"*verily and indeed taken*." When thus *taken*, true indeed it is, that it is to the refreshing of our *souls*, that *that* part of the *chyle*, which is extracted *from* it, is applied. But, as to the *verity*, with which it must have been *taken*, the particular application thus made of it, makes not any difference: whatever part of man's person it goes to the refreshment of,—to produce this refreshment; whatever it is, *taken* it must be:—*taken*? yes, and *digested* likewise:—or how can any thing like *refreshment* be afforded by it?

To make all points not only *plain and clear*, but moreover smooth and easy,—on *this*, as on so many other occasions, the word *spiritual* is at hand. In a *carnal, temporal* sense, not exactly true, *conceditur*: but besides the *carnal, temporal* source, for this, as for all other words for which it is wanted, there is a *spiritual* sense: and, if in this *spiritual* sense the thing be, as it is, true,—then, in this same *spiritual* sense, it is not only *as well* as if it were true in the *carnal* sense, but much better: better, viz. by the amount of the *superiority*—the undeniable superiority—of *things spiritual* over *things temporal*:—not to speak of *persons*.

So convenient is the use—so admirable the virtue—of the word *spiritual*. By it whatsoever things are *false* may at pleasure be made *true*: false in a *carnal*—false in a *temporal* sense—yes, so let them be:—still, in a *spiritual* sense, they are less capable of being true: whereupon,

in that purer and superior sense, if there be any *convenience* in their being true, true they are.

To perform this metamorphosis, you couple the word *spiritual*, as above, with the word *sense*. This done, take any proposition that you please, the more absurd the better:—a still more absurd one, than the above *cannibal* proposition, if—which it will hardly be found to do—the nature of things affords any where a more absurd one.—Proposed by itself, and without that support, which the adjunct in question has in store for every absurdity, the falsity of it is, in the mind of any man in his senses, too glaring to admit of its finding so much as a momentary acceptance. Thus it is with it in its *natural* sense. To the word *sense*, add the word *spiritual*, and now, instead of being absurd and *false*—false to a degree of palpable absurdity—it requires nothing but a simple assertion to render it true. Have you any such thing in hand as *a mind*, to subdue,—to soften,—to weaken?—a mind, which you want to convert into a species of wax, ready to be moulded at any time to your purpose, whatsoever that purpose be?—here then is your way to go to work upon it. Take in hand one of these absurd propositions—the more palpably absurd the better—try it upon the man in the first place, *without* subterfuge: try it upon him in its *natural* sense. If in that sense you find him swallowing it, so much the better:—but, if you find him giving it back to you immediately, unable or refusing to swallow it,—you then give it to him a second time, wrapped up in the words *spiritual* sense—a *spiritual* sense, (tell him) and no other, is the sense in which he is to understand it.

Alas!—the quantity of the good things of this wicked world, which, by men calling themselves *spiritual*, are every day consuming—would they but content themselves with the consuming of these same good things, in a *spiritual* sense,—leaving to the growers, and makers, and buyers, the consuming of them in a *carnal* sense,—how much less would there be to be seen of that *pauperism*, which, under the covering of prosperity, that glitters at and about the *head*, is, in the *heart* of the population, so plainly seen, as well as so severely felt!

Generally speaking, this *spiritual* sense—alias *nonsensical* sense—seems to be the opposite or negative of the *carnal* sense. Thus, for example, in this *cannibal* case;—viz. eating the body and blood of a man, or of a God, or of both together. —*Carnal* sense, *eating it*: *spiritual* sense, *not eating it*.

To this interpretation of the word *spiritual*, as applied to *sense*, give constancy and consistency, then, in so far as it is understood in this sense, there may be not much harm in it.—For, in that case, forasmuch as there is such a thing as *eating* the sort of food in question in a *spiritual* sense, so there will also be such a thing as *believing* in that same sense: and as, in a *spiritual* sense, *eating* is *not eating*,—so, in a *spiritual* sense, *believing* will be *not believing*.

On this plan, unspeakable will be the benefit both to *Faith* and to *Charity*: to *Faith*, because, on this plan, there is nothing whatsoever but may be believed—believed by all men and without difficulty:—to *Charity*, because, on this plan, throughout the whole field of divinity, the whole

mass of any two men's opinions,—in a word, of all men's opinions,—may, on every imaginable point, be as opposite as possible, and brotherly love not in any the smallest degree lessened by it:—take any proposition whatsoever, A believes it in a carnal or temporal sense, B, and every body else that differs from A, believes it in a spiritual sense. Here then, if, by and with this mode of unity, *Faith* is satisfied, so still more easily and heartily is *Charity*: *Hope* need never quit them, and thus every thing is as it should be.

Question 22.—What is required of them who come to the Lord's Supper?

Answer.—To examine themselves, whether (1) they repent them truly of their former sins (2), stedfastly purposing to lead a new life (3), have a lively faith in God's mercy through Christ (4), with a thankful remembrance of his death (5), and be in charity with all men.

OBSERVATIONS.

Five distinguishable alleged *duties*, forming so many subjects of examination, are here observable: five *duties* or *obligations*, concerning which every child is forced to affirm and declare, that he is persuaded of their having been imposed by the Almighty—imposed upon the child himself, together with all his fellow Christians.

Concerning all these supposed duties, the first question that presents itself as proper to be made, is—in any one of the histories we have of *Jesus*, what ground is there for any such supposition, as that, in the character of duties to be performed on the occasion of any such ceremony, as that which, having been instituted by the Church of Rome, and retained by the Church of England, is here spoken of,—duties, to this effect, or to any other

were by Jesus meant to be imposed upon any person whatsoever; and in particular upon any person, into whose mouth the declaration, to the effect that has just been seen, has ever been, or is ever destined to be forced?—*Answer*.—Not any. The ceremony itself, a mere modern invention;—the duties, thus attached to it, a mere fiction;—a fiction, put forth in the teeth of those undisputed and undisputable texts of Scripture, in which nothing that bears the smallest resemblance to it is to be found. In these texts, the persons addressed, no other than the *twelve* chosen disciples, distinguished by the name of *Apostles*;—no other disciples, or followers, being present,—or, so much as in the way of any the slightest and most general allusion, spoken of: even to these chosen few the act recommended, of such a nature,—a mere token and pledge of remembrance,—a social act of a purely convivial nature,—as scarcely to be capable of being taken for the subject of a duty. They *all* eat, they *all* drank:—thus say two of those three of his four biographers, by whom what passed at that supper is reported. At that same time, he (Jesus himself) eat with them, if *Luke* is to be believed: consequently, according to the orthodox interpretation, eat and drank along with them his thirteenth part of his own body and his own blood: which doing, he said to them, on that same occasion, according to that same *Luke*; “*This do in remembrance of me.*”^{*} A duty, if a

* Luke xxii. 15. “And he said unto them, With desire *I have desired to eat this passover* with you before I suffer:”
 “16. For I say unto you, I will not *any more* eat thereof until
 “it be fulfilled in the kingdom of God.” Such being his declared desire, and the means being at hand, and no obstacle at hand, of course that desire was fulfilled.

duty it can be called, plainly and expressly confined to *twelve* persons, then living and then present: and, in their instance, no such *accessory* duties as are here set up—no nor any other accessory duties—added to it;—such being the exact state of the case,—with the acknowledged standard of belief and practice before their eyes, up start a set of men, sixteen centuries after,—and, without deigning to assert, do more than assert—for they pretend to take for granted,—that, upon all that ever professed, or ever shall profess, the religion of Jesus, a whole swarm of duties, viz. the swarm thus confidently delivered, were, on that same occasion, imposed by him.

If, without support from any history, true or false,—and, on the contrary, in the teeth of so many histories, which now are, and then were in every body's hands—all of them recognized, as constituting, in relation to this very subject, the sole standard of belief and practice,—if, under such disadvantages, such palpable misrepresentation has been made—such gross impositions, not only attempted, but, by the arm of coercive power carried into effect with success,—what limits can there be to the impostures which, with the same support, may with like success have been attempted, on subjects, on which the power of imposture has found no such obstacle to check it?—*Tradition—Roman Catholic Tradition*—in this word—not to look any further—an indication is given of the sort of matter, in which an answer to this question may be found.

Under all these five heads of examination, and in particular under the first,—suppose however the answer were in the affirmative: on this sup-

position, various are the observations, which the answer would be apt to suggest, if considered in its several particular parts.

1. This supernatural recipe with what degree of frequency is it expected to be repeated?
 2. Suppose it were *a week*—suppose it but once *a month*—suppose even the number of doses taken in a year still smaller—Each time,—let the times follow one another ever so quickly,—here is “*a new life*” undertaken to be led:—such at least is to be, on each occasion, the “*stedfast purpose*.” But, of any such new life—(whatsoever may be meant by a new life)—what on any occasion, according to the string of intimations thus given, will be the fruit or use?—Each time there is to be “*repentance*”—each time the repentance is to be “*true*”—yet, true as it is, each and every time it is to be of no effect: the penitent being, all along, in the same sad case, as if no repentance had taken place. Each time the *purpose*, how “*stedfast*” soever it be, is to be broken through, and the condition which the penitent is thereupon to be in, is to be exactly the same as if no such “*purpose*” had been resolved upon. For, if that purpose be to lead a life without sin, then, suppose the purpose adhered to, of what use would be the *new life*?—The *new life*—no:—the *old life* is on that supposition the only *good* one:—a *new life*?—whatsoever of *novelty* his life had in it, he would, on this supposition, be but so much the worse for it.

Mark well, that all the time this perpetual alternative of sinning and repentance is going on, “*lively*” is to be the man’s “*faith in God’s mercy*.”

lively, in other words, his assurance—that upon repentance, forgiveness will each and every time follow. Full of comfort, no doubt, for the time, will this assurance be. For time *present*, yes:—But on the *future*, on each such occasion, what, if any, will be, at all times, its *tendency*, and but too probably its effect? What but to give encouragement—and by encouragement birth—to sin?

In a word—to use a familiar, but not the less opposite, expression—at the end of each such supper, *a new score*, it appears, is to be considered as commenced; and, at the conclusion of each immediately succeeding one, such new score will, if the view thus given of the effect be a correct one, be considered as *rubbed off*. In an account of sins, any more than in an account of money, can there be any stronger, or indeed other encouragement to the running up of a fresh score, than the assurance of having it rubbed off *at pleasure*: rubbed off at any time, and at no other expense than that of a few words of course.

As to contrition, *grief, sorrow, penitence, repentance*,—whatever be the *words* employed,—for any such affection, what room does the nature of the case leave in the breast of a man, whose persuasion is—that he is dealing upon such terms? *Sin*, he may thus at all times have his bellyfull of: only one thing he must not forget, which is—that in some manner or other, between the time of his committing each such sin, and the time of the next supper of this sort that he partakes of, he must “truly repent,” i. e. be sincerely sorry for it.—Take a mouthful of bread and a mouthful of wine—taking care that before they are swallowed, whatsoever sins it has happened to you to

commit, since the *last* preceding mouthful of each was swallowed, are truly repented of,—vanished are all these sins: all these sinful acts are caused not to have happened, and every thing is as it should be. Such is the virtue of this bread, and of this wine:—if not this, then what else is it?

Under or over the *Church of Rome*, certain Popes used for some time to be selling this sort of licence (*indulgence* was in the language of technical theology, its appropriate name): and, in that Church, to a *Church-of-England* eye, it was of course every thing that was mischievous and abominable. By these Popes it was granted indeed, but in retail only, at so much per sin, and at high prices: and, the higher the prices, the smaller the number of those, in whose instance it could be obtained, and thereby become productive of its mischievous effects. But, if even under the Church of Rome this licensing system was a mischievous one, under the Church of England, how much greater must not be the mischievousness of it? Under the Church of England, at so small a price as that of the Table offering, if any such there be, it is put into every hand that can afford to pay that small price: and the whole mass of sins, which, between supper and supper, a man can see his convenience in committing—the whole mass, be they in spirit and number what they may, are thus included in one and the same *indulgence*.

Has it not *this* effect?—Well then, if it has not, no effect has it whatever:—and such, from beginning to end, is the perpetual alternative. *Justification*,—shadow of Justification, the case affords not any: *apology*, *palliation*, this is all

that can be made or done for it. That, when all is said and done, things may, by a dispensation of God's providence, produced by an act of God's mercy, turn out to be in that same state, in which they would have been, had nothing of this sort been either said or done,—such is the most favourable result, of which, under the guidance of the most prejudiced judgment, the most sanguine imagination can entertain a hope.

And, in that most favourable case, can it really be said to be thus destitute of effect?—Yes: but in no other sense than that, in which, after having, for a length of time, been employed, dose after dose, without success, in the hope of curing some disease, *opium* may be said to have been destitute of effect. The non-existence of *particular* effect—viz. of the particular *good* effect hoped for—is but too true. But, of a *general* effect—and *that* a most disastrous one—the *existence* is at the same time but too true—a prostration of strength—an universal debility—“that prostration of the understanding and will,” by which the constitution is destroyed.*

RECAPITULATION.

On recurring to the Observations contained in the preceding pages, the following are the *vices* which will, it is believed, be found to have been proved upon this formulary, the peccant matter

* And the production of which is among the *declared* objects of the NATIONAL INSTITUTION, according to the form given to it by the BENCH OF BISHOPS; and in particular of the BISHOP OF LONDON's labours in support of it.

of which is, with a diligence unhappily so successful, injected, by the hand of power, into the breasts of the great majority of the population, at the very first dawn of the reasoning faculty—

I. **BAD GRAMMAR.** For a passage teaching bad grammar by example, see p. 64.

II. **BAD LOGIC; viz.**

1. By inculcation of matter plainly useless. See p. 25 to 31.
2. By inculcation of manifest surplusage. See p. 8, 9, 10.
3. By inculcation of matter plainly unintelligible. See p. 8 to 16, 23 to 35, 38, 40.
4. By inculcation of propositions inconsistent with one another. See p. 14, 15, 16, 17.
5. By inculcation of instruction which is either erroneous, or at best useless. See p. 49, 50, 51, 52.
6. By exemplification and consequent inculcation of the art and habit of gratuitous or unfounded assertion, and groundless inference. See p. 35, 36, 37, 46, 47, 48, 49.
7. By inculcation of matter, repugnant to those Thirty-nine Articles, to which the whole body of the Clergy—Bishops and Archbishops included—together with all other ruling and otherwise influential persons,—who become partakers of that course of education which is in highest repute, will, upon entrance into that course, after being thus impregnated with the repugnant matter of this formulary, be forced to declare their assent and approbation on record. See p. 36 to 37.

8. By inculcation of matter savouring of Poverty. See p. 75 to 80.

III. Matter, the tendency of which is—to operate, in various *other* ways, to the depravation of the INTELLECTUAL part of man's frame, viz.

1. Matter, by which the principle of *vicarious obligation* is inculcated: i. e. by which children are commanded to believe, that it is in the power of two or three self-appointed persons, by agreeing together, to oblige a young child, in conscience, to pursue to the end of his life, any course of conduct, which, at that time, it may please them to prescribe. See p. 6, 7, 8.
2. Matter, by which the young child is himself forced to utter a *rash promise*, binding him, during life, to pursue the course of conduct therein and thereby prescribed. See p. 17.
3. Matter, by which the child is initiated in the art and habit of *lax interpretation*: i. e. of declaring, in relation to the discourse in question, whatever it may be, his persuasion, that such or such was the meaning, intended by the *author* to be conveyed by it: viz. whatever meaning it may at any time happen to suit the personal purpose of the *interpreter* so to convey, how wide soever of the import really so intended to be conveyed. See p. 53 to 57.
4. Matter, by which the *intellectual* part of the child's frame is destined to be *debilitated* and *depraved* by groundless and useless terrors. See p. 12, 13, 14, 61.

IV. Matter; the tendency of which is to operate, in various other ways, to the DEPRAVATION of the MORAL part of man's frame: viz.

1. Matter, in the texture of which *Hypocrisy* is plainly discernible. See p. 15, 16.

2. Matter, by which *lying* is inculcated as a duty:—a duty, which the child is forced to declare himself bound to persevere in the performance of. See p. 4, 5, 18, 24, 25, 38, 39, 53, 54, 60.

3. Matter, by which *Imposture* may be seen to be promoted. See p. 55 to 89.

4. Matter, by which *Forgery* may be seen to be knowingly uttered. See p. 19, 20, 21.

5. Matter, by which encouragement is given to sin and *wickedness in every shape*. See p. 86 to 89.

V. Matter, the tendency of which is to operate, in an immediate way, to the injury of the SENSITIVE part of man's frame.

• Matter, by which groundless and useless terrors are infused, as above.

Such,—on the grounds all along referred to, and plainly brought to view,—is the character and tendency herein *imputed* to this Church of England formulary, with the matter of which every English breast is, by the government at large, under the guidance of the ruling part of the Clergy, designed and endeavoured to be impregnated: *imputed*, and with what *justice*, let any person in whose eyes either the morals or the understanding of the whole people of England are objects worthy of regard, and who at the same time has courage to look in the face truth, however unwelcome, and opposed by prejudices

ever so inveterate, lay his hand upon his heart and pronounce.

Ill will towards men,—towards all men, in whatsoever rank in life situated, with reference to him in whose breast the corrupt affection is evident—equal, superior, or inferior,—this, taking the whole together, may now be added to the list of those fruits, the seeds of which are so thickly sown by this machine. Ill will and, from ill will, oppression and persecution:—oppression the *chronical* disease, persecution, the *acute*: oppression, universal, habitual, and sluggish; persecution particular and casual; according as opportunity happens to be favourable.

The genealogy is in this wise: From *imaginary* grace, *imaginary mystery*, *imaginary sacrament*, come *imaginary blasphemy*, *imaginary sin*; from *imaginary sin*, comes *real antipathy*; and from men, in ruling and otherwise influential situations, *real oppression* and *real persecution*, on that one part; *real suffering* on the other:—for, by the *imaginary sin*, is produced, in the ruling breast, along with the antipathy, a pretence for gratifying it.

GOOD MEN, GOOD SUBJECTS, and GOOD CHRISTIANS—such, and in these very words, are the *goods*, which,—in giving the explanation of his truly admirable, and beyond doubt *ultimately* and highly useful, system of intellectual machinery,—over and over again,—and always, by means of a set of instruments, of which this formulary is the earliest and beyond comparison the most extensively employed article,—over and over again:—and, as here, in *placard letters*—*Dr. Bell* undertakes for the manufacturing.

Good men and Good Christians! and by means of a thorough impregnation with the matter of this formulary!—Yes: if, of *Good men and Good Christians*, the characteristic qualities are—*hypocrisy, lying, imposture, forgery, sin and vice* in every other shape.

Good subjects? Yes: if the *goodness* of the subjection be in proportion to the *abjectness* of it: for, of abjectness in the subjection of the *subject many* to the dominion of the *ruling few*, can any more conclusive exemplification be exhibited, than that which is afforded, by the practice thus persevered in, of the swallowing of matter, thus poisonous to the whole moral texture of man's frame?—*Good Subjects?*—Yes: if the *Good Subject* be a character purposely selected to form a contrast with that of the *Good Citizen*: a description, by which—though now so studiously marked out for infamy as descriptive of an enlisted partizan of *anarchy*—no Frenchman, in the most despotic æra of the monarchy, ever scrupled to designate himself.

GOOD MEN, GOOD SUBJECTS, and GOOD CHRISTIANS!—Yes: let us not only wish, but hope, and even believe—that in and from the mind-turning mill, invented and worked by *Dr. Bell*, all these good articles will in conclusion be manufactured and issued out for use. Manufactured?—but by what instrument?—By this formulary?—No:—but, if at all, *in spite* of it.

The greater the efficiency of this admirable instrument—the more capable in its own nature of being, in all its efficiency, applied to the best uses—the greater in the breast of a true lover of mankind will be the regret at seeing it, in the

very first application made of it, employed in thus thickly sowing in the mind, at the earliest dawn of reason, the seeds of depravity in every shape.

For consolation one hope remains:—and this is—that, after having, with whatsoever success, been thus employed in the introduction of the disease, it may, in a maturer state of the faculties—such is the nature of the instrument—be, still more effectually as well as more worthily, rendered conducive to the extirpation of it.

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